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ABSTRACT
Prosecutors have a significant but unrecognized constitutional role in our criminal justice system
to prevent juries from discriminating based upon the race or gender of the victim. The
prosecutorial role to “do justice” includes the crucial responsibility to provide true equal protection
of the law, yet prosecutors lack the constitutional tools they need for the job. This article argues
that defendants’ constitutional procedural rights to root out unlawful jury discrimination should
also be made available to prosecutors. From the acquittal of the police officers who beat up Rodney
King on videotape to acquittals in countless rape cases with “imperfect” victims, prosecutors often
lose battles against discriminatory acquittal because they lack any constitutional weapons for the
fight. While the Supreme Court has created several different procedural remedies to prevent jury
discrimination against defendants, the Court has never given prosecutors the equivalent
constitutional language to enforce their own equal protection role.
Specifically, prosecutors should share the defendant’s constitutional right to voir dire jurors about
their potential prejudices. Voir dire on juror bias is an imperfect but crucial procedural protection
that has received very little scholarly attention. Currently, the Supreme Court allows defendants a
very narrow right to voir dire about racism only when race will clearly be at issue in the case. This
article concludes that both prosecutors and defendants should have a constitutional right to root
out unlawful discrimination during jury selection through voir dire, and that right should apply
in every case.
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INTRODUCTION
The popular image of the heroic lawyer battling jury discrimination is that of the criminal defense lawyer, an Atticus Finch
1
representing a black client before an all-white jury. We tend not to
remember the other brave lawyers, the prosecutors who charged
lynchings and hate crimes despite the near-certainty of an acquittal
from a racist jury. From the trials of defendants charged with killing
Emmett Till and beating Rodney King, to domestic violence and rape
cases, prosecutors frequently fight jury discrimination against minori2
ty and female victims. Yet prosecutors have no constitutional proce1
2

  

HARPER LEE, TO KILL A MOCKINGBIRD (1960).
See generally M. SUSAN ORR-KLOPFER, THE EMMETT TILL BOOK (2005) (describing a case in
which state prosecutors brought two white defendants to trial for the lynching of Emmett
Till, a fifteen-year-old black boy who whistled at a white woman; subsequently an all-white
jury acquitted the defendants, after which the defendants were free to brag about the
murder with protection from double jeopardy); REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT
COMMISSION ON THE LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT (1991), available at
http://www.parc.info/client_files/Special%20Reports/1%20%20Chistopher%20Commision.pdf (recounting the aftermath of the trial of several Los
Angeles police officers charged with the beating of Rodney King—a case that gained national publicity because the beating was caught on videotape; in the aftermath, Los An-
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dural rights to protect against what I term “discriminatory acquittal.”
Courts have created numerous important procedural rights to try to
prevent discrimination against defendants, but they have not yet recognized equivalent rights to protect victims from jury discrimination.
Prosecutors should have the tools they need to provide true “equal
protection” of the law.
Courts and scholars alike ignore jury discrimination against the
4
victims of crimes, despite the enormity of the problem. Throughout
our history, juries have purposely freed those who lynched, raped,
and committed other hate crimes, sending a message of the permis5
sibility of such violence. Rape conviction rates and death penalty
6
rates correlate heavily with the race of the victim. Juries are significantly less likely to punish violence against black people in the same
7
way as they punish violence against whites. In the context of gender,
juries often put a victim of rape and domestic violence on trial based

3
4

5

6

7

geles erupted into riots following the acquittal, causing 53 deaths, 2383 injuries, more
than 7000 fires, damages to 3100 businesses, and nearly $1 billion in financial losses).
Tania Tetlow, Discriminatory Acquittal, 18 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 75, 80–81 (2009).
See Daniel Givelber, Meaningless Acquittals, Meaningful Convictions: Do We Reliably Acquit the
Innocent?, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 1317, 1325 n.25 (1997) (asserting that no legal literature
exists dealing with acquittals); Alexandra Natapoff, Underenforcement, 75 FORDHAM L. REV.
1715, 1715–17 (2006) (noting that scholars rarely address underenforcement of the law).
See infra Part I. Discriminatory acquittal constitutes an important subset of the general
problem of discriminatory underenforcement of the law, a problem which has received
more scholarly attention. See RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 29–135
(1997) [hereinafter KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW] (describing the destructive effects of racially selective underprotection of the law); see also Randall Kennedy, The State,
Criminal Law, and Racial Discrimination: A Comment, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1255, 1267 n.55
(1994) (quoting LEON WHIPPLE, OUR ANCIENT LIBERTIES: THE STORY OF THE ORIGIN AND
MEANING OF CIVIL AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 144 (1927) (“[T]he
most extensive and frequent losses of liberty are not due either to court or executive, but
to the failure of the force of the government to protect men from violence and mobs.
The history of liberty could almost be written in terms of mobs that got away with it, and
were never punished—from the Tory-hunters of 1778 to the Ku Klux Klan of 1927.”));
Natapoff, supra note 4 at 1717; William J. Stuntz, Accountable Policing 42–43 (Harvard Pub.
Law, Working Paper No. 130, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=886170.
See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 286–87 (1987) (finding that juries’ death penalty
verdicts correlate highly to the race of the victim); see also Jeffrey J. Pokorak, Rape as a
Badge of Slavery: The Legal History of, and Remedies for, Prosecutorial Race-of-Victim Charging
Disparities, 7 NEV. L.J. 1, 36–38, 41 (2006) (arguing that while the differences in the rates
of reported rapes are statistically insignificant between black and white rape and sexual
assault victims, the rate of dismissals and rejections in rape cases involving black victims
was nearly 30% higher than those involving white victims); Tetlow, supra note 3, at 89–90
(“Before 1977, . . . jury verdicts demonstrated an extraordinary rate of disparate sentencing [in rape cases] according to the race of both the victim and the defendant . . . . Modern statistics also show a marked disparity in conviction rates according to the race of the
rape victim.”).
See id.
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on whether she behaved as a “proper” woman, rather than focusing
8
on the culpability of the defendant. As a result of this endemic problem, prosecutors have a crucial obligation to fight for true equal protection of the law.
We invest prosecutors with the ethical role of “doing justice” but
do not consider whether they have any constitutional tools to help
9
them do so. The trial procedures used to prevent discrimination
against defendants should also be available for prosecutors to prevent
discrimination against victims. At the moment, however, the prosecutor picking a jury in a hate crime or domestic violence trial has no
constitutional language to describe the risk of juror discrimination
against the alleged victim.
As a start, prosecutors should share in the equal protection rights
given to defendants during jury selection. In Georgia v. McCollum, the
Supreme Court granted prosecutors one of these rights; the Court
held that the Batson v. Kentucky rule banning the racial use of pe10
While
remptory challenges should also govern defense counsel.
McCollum failed to ground its reasoning on the rights of the black victims in that hate crime case, it did provide support for the role of
11
The
prosecutors in protecting the fairness of the entire system.
Court should go further, acknowledge the real scope of the equal
protection rights at stake, and extend the remaining protections
against jury discrimination to prosecutors.
One of the most important and overlooked equal protection
rights during jury selection, and the one that I focus on here, is the
right to voir dire jurors about their potential prejudices. Voir dire is
no panacea, but it is one of the only tools available to root out jury
12
discrimination. Skillful use of voir dire can give lawyers important
8
9
10

11

12

See id.; Tetlow, supra note 3, at 76–77, 93–94.
Instead we ground prosecutors’ procedural rights in vague and discretionary notions of
fair play in an adversarial system. See infra Part III.
Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59 (1992) (relying upon Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S.
79 (1986)). In McCollum, the Court, relying upon Batson, the Sixth Amendment, and the
Georgia Constitution, concluded that, if the State demonstrates a prima facie case of racial discrimination by the defendant in jury challenges, the defendant must present a racially neutral explanation for peremptory challenges. Id.
Id. at 55–59. In McCollum, white defendants charged with a hate crime attempted to use
peremptory challenges on every black potential juror. Id. at 45. The Court held that the
Batson rule should apply to defense counsel, banning the racial use of peremptory challenges by either party. Id. at 48–50. McCollum provides some support for the constitutional rights of prosecutors, but it is a missed opportunity to recognize discriminatory acquittal. Instead, the Court relied on the prosecutors’ third-party standing to protect the
public’s perception of race-neutral justice and the rights of potential jurors against being
stereotyped. Id. at 55–56.
See infra Part III.
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information about potential jurors’ degrees of empathy for minorities
or antipathy towards women, and about jurors’ positions on hate
13
crimes and rape. Currently, only the defendant can lay claim to a
constitutional right to voir dire about racial bias and only in overly
14
limited circumstances.
Part I of the Article defines categories of “discriminatory acquittals” and summarizes the historical and empirical evidence of the size
15
of the problem. Part II addresses third-party standing for prosecutors to raise the equal protection rights of victims and explains why it
is appropriate to task prosecutors with representing the collective
16
equal protection rights of victims. No one else can properly fill this
role. While civil law systems give victims direct participation in trials,
our Constitution creates an adversarial system that does not comport
with third-party involvement, no matter how invested the third party
17
is in the outcome. Part III describes the importance of voir dire to
protect against discriminatory juries, and argues that a defendant’s
right to voir dire about juror prejudice should also apply to prosecu18
tors and that the right should be expanded for both.
I. DISCRIMINATORY ACQUITTAL IS A PERVASIVE CONSTITUTIONAL
VIOLATION
Discriminatory acquittals violate the Equal Protection Clause for
19
the same reasons that discriminatory convictions do. Jury verdicts
constitute state action bound by the Constitution and must not be
20
motivated by race or gender discrimination. The Supreme Court
has been adamant in its proclamations that discrimination should
have no place in a criminal trial, and in its McCleskey v. Kemp decision,
did not question the idea that jury discrimination based on the race
21
of victims would violate the Equal Protection Clause.
13
14

15
16
17
18
19
20
21

  

Id.
See Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 597 (1976) (holding that “[t]he mere fact that the victim of the crimes alleged was a white man and the defendants were [black]” did not warrant a need to question potential jurors specifically about racial prejudice).
See infra Part I.
See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part III.
See Tetlow, supra note 3, at 103–05 (arguing that discriminatory acquittals violate the
Equal Protection Clause).
Id. at 105–07; Sheri Lynn Johnson, Black Innocence and the White Jury, 83 MICH. L. REV.
1611, 1682 (1985).
McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292 (1987). McCleskey involved the awkward procedural
posture of a defendant arguing that he was less likely to have received the death penalty
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Prosecutors encounter two broad types of discriminatory acquittal
by juries, which I briefly describe below: (1) acquittals motivated by
condoning racial or gender violence, particularly when the violence
22
seems to punish the victim for failure to obey racial or gender
23
24
rules; or (2) a general lack of empathy for minority victims.
We have a long history of juries acquitting in order to affirmatively
25
condone racial violence.
Well into the twentieth century, defendants could lynch, assassinate, and commit hate crimes with impuni26
ty. In the rare cases in which police made an arrest and prosecutors
brought charges, all-white juries remained the ultimate protector of
27
private racial violence. Their verdicts sent clear signals about the

22

23

24

25

26

27

had he killed a minority victim, but nevertheless, the Court accepted at face value the viability of those claims based on jury discrimination against the race of the victim. Id. at
291–92, 308–09.
The protection of black victims from private violence shielded by all-white juries motivated the ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment. See Douglas L. Colbert, Challenging
the Challenge: Thirteenth Amendment as a Prohibition Against the Racial Use of Peremptory Challenges, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 38 (1990) (describing an instance in which Congressman
William Kelley read into the congressional record an 1864 New Orleans newspaper editorial criticizing an all-white jury’s acquittal of a man who admitted to killing a black
man).
Serena Mayeri, Note, “A Common Fate of Discrimination”: Race-Gender Analogies in Legal and
Historical Perspective, 110 YALE L.J. 1045, 1081–83 (2001) (describing the ways in which
proponents of the Violence Against Women Act’s civil rights remedies made comparisons
between racially-motivated crimes and the underenforcement of gender-based violence).
See Tetlow, supra note 3, at 81–82; see also Colbert, supra note 22, at 112 (citing Marina
Miller & Jay Hewitt, Conviction of a Defendant as a Function of Juror-Victim Racial Similarity,
105 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 21, 159–60 (1978)) (describing a study showing that 80% of black
jurors voted to convict a black defendant of raping a black woman, versus 32% of white
jurors).
What was deemed criminal assault or homicide, if committed by a white person against a
white person, became acceptable and effectively decriminalized when the victim was
black. Colbert, supra note 22, at 18–22, 28, 40–42. The murder of a slave by a white person was not considered a crime and slaves were denied access to courts and prevented
from testifying against white people. Id. at 18–19. In the unusual event that a northern
colony recognized the crime of raping a black woman, the legislature provided special de
jure protection for the white offender; immediately following the Civil War, violence
against black victims often went unpunished since local law enforcement refused to prosecute white offenders. Id. at 28, 40. In Texas, whites were indicted and charged with 500
murders of blacks between 1865 and 1866, but all-white juries acquitted every one of the
defendants). Id. at 41.
See Tetlow, supra note 3, at 82–84 (describing the reign of terror after Emancipation,
marked with private violence used to enforce the racial order, lynchings, and the assassination of civil rights workers); see also Colbert, supra note 22, at 87 (showing that between
1955 and 1965, white southerners were charged with fifty-eight civil rights killings, but only six were convicted and fewer received prison sentences).
See, e.g., John Herbers, Beckwith’s 2d Trial Ends in Hung Jury, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 1964, at 1
(reporting how, in two trials, all-white juries refused to convict Byron De La Beckwith for
the murder of Medgar W. Evers, an NAACP official).
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permissibility of racial violence, particularly violence meant to en28
force the racial order. Acquittals proved to be far more public sig29
nals than the refusal of the police and prosecutor to act.
30
We still see suspicious acquittals in hate crime prosecutions, but
the more common modern example of discriminatory acquittal is the
31
continuing acceptance of sexual violence against black women.
Empirical evidence shows that the race of a victim matters enormous32
ly to the conviction rates for rape.
It is also far easier for defendants to claim self-defense for violence
against a black victim than a white victim. Jurors tend to project racial stereotypes of aggression and hostility onto black victims in ways
that make it easier for defendants to claim that alleged victims were
33
actually the initial aggressors. From the acquittals of Bernard Goetz
to the Los Angeles Police Department (“LAPD”) officers who beat
34
Rodney King, the public perception of jury discrimination against
35
black victims has led to great public controversy, and even to riots.

28

29
30
31

32
33

34

  

See Tetlow, supra note 3, at 84 (“Even more than the silent inaction of police and prosecutors, such jury verdicts made dramatic statements about the permissibility of raciallymotivated violence.”).
Id.
Id. at 84–85 (citing the infamous Rodney King incident as a modern-day hate crime prosecution).
Id. at 88–90 (describing the history of legalized rapes of black women during slavery and
the refusal to enforce rape laws against black women thereafter); see also Colbert, supra
note 22, at 18, 28.
Tetlow, supra note 3, at 90 (“Modern statistics also show a marked disparity in conviction
rates according to the race of the rape victim.”).
See Patricia G. Devine, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Their Automatic and Controlled Components,
56 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 5, 8 (1989) (providing an empirical discussion of the
implications of stereotypes and prejudice).
See, e.g., Stephen L. Carter, Comment, When Victims Happen to Be Black, 97 YALE L.J. 420,
428 (1988) (describing the acquittal of Bernard Goetz for the shooting of four young
black men on a subway, based on his unsupported claim of self-defense); Jesse McKinley,
Officer Guilty in Killing that Inflamed Oakland, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2010, at A11 (recounting a
conviction of a transit officer for involuntary manslaughter, as opposed to second-degree
murder, after contending that the shooting of the unarmed victim, Oscar Grant, was an
accident prompted by his confusion of his sidearm with his Taser); see REPORT OF THE
INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON THE LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT, supra note 3 (citing as the impetus for the report the acquittal of Los Angeles police officers on charges of
beating Rodney King, a black man, despite the fact that the violence was caught on videotape); see also Robert D. McFadden, Verdict Bares Sharp Feelings on Both Sides, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 26, 2000, at A1 (outlining racial divisions following the acquittal of four white police
officers in the shooting death of an unarmed black man); Rocco Parascandola, N.Y. Prepares For Verdict in Fifty-Shot Killings, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2008, at A21 (showing New York
City’s preparation for uprising in anticipation of the acquittal of three police officers in
the fifty-bullet shooting of a black man); John Seewer, Ohio Officer Acquitted of Killing Mom
Holding Baby, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 4, 2008 (referring to protests in the wake of a white
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Empirical evidence reveals another more subtle type of discriminatory acquittal, what Randall Kennedy generally calls “racially selec36
tive empathy.” Studies of the death penalty show a marked discrimination against black victims, far more pronounced than that against
37
defendants. The Baldus study, presented to the Supreme Court in
McCleskey v. Kemp, proved that juries in Georgia were 4.3 times more
likely to impose the death penalty for the killers of white victims than
38
39
for the killers of black victims. These disparities continue. Whether conscious or not, juries in the aggregate tend to devalue the lives
40
of murdered black victims.
In the context of gender, the conviction rate for rape and domestic violence is demonstrably lower than other kinds of violent crimes
41
because juries do not necessarily disapprove of such violence. Just
as juries have allowed violence against black people who violated the
42
racial code, juries still famously focus on whether female victims deserved the violence against them. Conviction rates in rape and domestic violence cases correspond to the perceived virtue of the victim
43
and whether she behaved as a properly obedient woman.
At a minimum, discriminatory acquittals indicate that violence
against certain categories of people matter less. At their worst, discriminatory acquittals grant very public permission for violence
against those who violate the racial order or who do not behave as

35
36

37
38
39

40

41
42
43

police officer’s acquittal of misdemeanor charges of negligent homicide and negligent assault after shooting a black woman while she was holding her one-year-old child).
See Tetlow, supra note 3, at 84–85.
KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW, supra note 5, at 384–85 (coining the term “racially
selective empathy” and describing its possible effects on criminal punishments for drug
offenses).
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 286–87 (1987).
Id. at 287.
Tetlow, supra note 3, at 86–87 (describing empirical studies from the 1990s that showed
continued racial disparity in the imposition of the death penalty according to the race of
the victim).
Empirical studies tend to focus on the death penalty, so we have to extrapolate to criminal conviction rates; but as discussed above, rape conviction rates also vary based on the
race of the victim. See Carter, supra note 34, at 447 (“American legal and political culture
seems to suggest . . . that there are two varieties of people who are involved in criminal activity, black people and victims. So perhaps when victims happen to be black, the culture
rationalizes the seeming contradiction by denying that there has been a crime.”).
Tetlow, supra note 3, at 90–94.
Id. at 76–77 (describing lynchings for violations of the racial order, specifically the example of Emmett Till, killed after whistling at a white woman).
Id. at 93–94 (asserting that rape trials focus less on the defendant’s intent to rape than on
whether the victim somehow deserved the assault because of her lack of virtue or unwillingness to fight to the death, just as domestic violence trials often focus on whether the
victim provoked the abuse by nagging or cheating).
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44

proper women. Women and minorities understand that breaking
45
certain rules means that they can be beaten or raped with impunity.
Given the importance and the scope of the problem, we should grant
prosecutors the constitutional procedures to prevent jury discrimination against victims.
II. VESTING THE PROSECUTOR WITH THE DUTY TO DEFEND AGAINST
JURY DISCRIMINATION
At the moment, prosecutors have few rights rooted in the Constitution, which correctly prioritizes the rights of defendants against the
46
State. The prosecutorial rights I propose are grounded in the Supreme Court’s clear mandate that race and gender discrimination
have no place anywhere in a jury trial, and that we should give prose47
cutors the tools to help combat such discrimination. As McCleskey v.
Kemp itself made clear, discrimination by juries against either defen48
dants or victims violates the Equal Protection Clause.
We should recognize a role for prosecutors to battle the endemic
49
problem of jury discrimination against victims. Particularly when
prosecutors participate in jury selection, they should be able to articulate the constitutional import of their efforts to root out discrimi44

45

46

47

48

49

Natapoff, supra note 4, at 1759–60, 1772 (asserting that underenforcement of the law exposes residents to crime and insecurity, as well as reinforcing the idea that the state has
abandoned them).
KENNEDY, CRIME, RACE, AND THE LAW, supra note 5, at 29–75 (arguing that discriminatory
underenforcement of the law and the private violence it permits do more to restrict the
liberty of women and minorities than does direct discrimination by the state).
See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 56 (1992) (holding that a state has a right to protect the fairness and integrity of its own judicial process). Prosecutors also have the right
to enormous discretion in charging decisions based on an argument for the separation of
powers. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (describing the great
deference that is given to prosecutorial discretion).
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 628 (1991) (“Racial bias mars the integrity of the judicial system and prevents the idea of democratic government from becoming a reality.”) (citing Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 556 (1979); Smith v. Texas, 311
U.S. 128, 130 (1940)).
481 U.S. 279, 349–58 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). For a more in-depth consideration of why discriminatory acquittal violates the Constitution, see Tetlow, supra note 3, at
103–16.
See generally Tetlow, supra note 3. Such procedures should be granted to prosecutors.
One possibility is to prohibit defense lawyers from urging the jury to violate the Constitution by discriminating against the victim’s race or gender. Id. at 127–28. In addition to
the existing evidentiary problems with such prejudicial arguments, appeals to discrimination invite constitutional error. Id. at 128. Prosecutors should also have a right to use
broad voir dire and peremptory challenges to root out bias against victims. Id. at 126–27.
This Article fleshes out the most important category of these procedures—that involving
jury selection.
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nation. As yet, the Supreme Court has never granted third-party
50
The
standing to protect the equal protection rights of victims.
Court instead has granted prosecutors a much more tepid role to
51
represent the interest in the “public perception of fairness.”
We must ask the question of whether prosecutors can ethically,
pragmatically, and constitutionally fulfill the role that I propose.
Doing battle against discriminatory acquittal falls squarely within a
52
prosecutor’s ethical duty to “do justice” and should easily meet
third-party standing requirements. I also firmly believe that prosecutors will choose to exercise their newfound rights for the very same
self-interested reason that lawyers like to win cases once they go to
trial.
It is also worth asking whether such a role might better be fulfilled
by others. We might assign the obligation to root out jury discrimination entirely to trial judges, for example, though judges have less incentive to conduct the thorough voir dire that I propose. More intriguing, the Supreme Court recently came perilously close to deciding
the constitutionality of private prosecutions by victims themselves,
53
who might do better to root out jury discrimination aimed at them.
Unfortunately, the direct participation of victims, common in our history and still common in civil law systems, seems too onerous a task to
impose on victims and too disruptive to the rights of defendants in
our adversarial system.
Ultimately, prosecutors are the best situated in our adversarial system to protect against discriminatory acquittal. As they choose juries
and conduct trials, prosecutors have the ethical obligation to do justice and the pragmatic desire to win convictions. They need not
represent victims individually in order to protect against collective
discrimination against women and minorities as such.

50
51

52
53

For a broader discussion of why victims have such equal protection rights, see Tetlow, supra note 3, at 122–28.
As I describe below, in McCollum, the Court allowed prosecutors to complain about the
racial use of peremptory challenges by the defendant and stretched state action doctrine
to apply the Equal Protection Clause to defense attorneys. 505 U.S. 42, 56 (1992). But,
McCollum missed the opportunity to rely on the rights of victims, an argument prosecutors never made to the Court in that hate crime trial.
See infra note 78.
Robertson v. United States ex rel. Watson, 130 S. Ct. 2184, 2185 (2010).
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A. Prosecutors Can Exercise Third-Party Standing on Behalf of the Collective
Right of Victims to Equal Protection of the Law
In the context of jury selection, the Supreme Court has proved extremely willing to grant both prosecutors and defense lawyers broad
third-party standing to protect criminal trials from equal protection
54
violations. In the Batson line of cases, the Court allows both sides to
raise the equal protection rights of potential jurors against the use of
55
56
peremptory challenges based on race or gender. Both sides can
57
also act to protect the public’s interest in the perception of fairness.
Yet the Court has never recognized the prosecutor’s role in protecting against discriminatory acquittal, despite being offered the
58
perfect opportunity to do so in Georgia v. McCollum. McCollum was
a white defendant charged with a racially-motivated crime against
black victims, who then sought to exercise all of his peremptory
59
strikes against black jurors. The Court granted prosecutors’ interlocutory appeal, and held that the Batson rule should apply to defendants and forbid the racial use of peremptory challenges by defense
60
attorneys. Notably, neither party raised the interests of the alleged
61
black victims against the striking of black jurors.
54

55

56

57

58
59
60
61

  

The Court has even granted third-party standing for defendants to complain about exclusion of potential jurors of a different race. See generally Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 411–
15 (1991) (holding that the defendant had standing to assert the equal protection rights
of a juror because he was able to show: that he had suffered an injury in fact because of
his sufficient interest in having neutral jury selection processes, that he had a close relation to the third-party (excluded juror) in their common interest to eliminate racial discrimination, and that it is nearly impractical for a juror to bring suit himself).
See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 95 (1986) (holding that “a defendant may make
a prima facie showing of purposeful racial discrimination in selection of the venire by relying solely on the facts concerning its selection in his case.”); McCollum, 505 U.S. at 59
(holding that “the Constitution prohibits a criminal defendant from engaging in purposeful discrimination on the ground of race in the exercise of peremptory challenges”).
See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 140 (1994) (“Discrimination in jury
selection, whether based on race or on gender, causes harm to the litigants, the community, and the individual jurors who are wrongfully excluded from participation in the
judicial process.”).
See id. (“Discriminatory use of peremptory challenges may create the impression that the
judicial system has acquiesced in suppressing full participation by one gender or that the
‘deck has been stacked’ in favor of one side.”); Batson, 476 U.S. at 87 (“Selection procedures that purposefully exclude black persons from juries undermine public confidence
in the fairness of our system of justice.”); Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 56 (1992)
(noting that “a State suffers a similar injury when the fairness and integrity of its own
judicial process is undermined”).
McCollum, 505 U.S. at 56.
Id. at 45.
Id. at 59.
See Petitioner’s Brief on the Merits, McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1990) (No. 91-372), 1990 WL
512752; Respondents’ Brief on the Merits, McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992) (No. 91-372),
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The Court did not focus on a prosecutor’s standing to fight for
meaningful, race-neutral justice for the black victims of the charged
hate crime, but ironically granted prosecutors standing to protect the
62
appearance of race-neutral justice. Ruling in the wake of the twomonth old Rodney King acquittal and the resulting conflagration in
Los Angeles, the Court cited the prevention of riots as a reason to
63
preserve public confidence. “In such cases, emotions in the affected
community will inevitably be heated and volatile. Public confidence
in the integrity of the criminal judicial system is essential for preserv64
ing community peace in trials involving race-related crimes.” The
actual injustice motivating the rioters did not merit a mention.
While the Supreme Court missed an opportunity in McCollum to
stake a claim against racial bias against victims, the case does provide
support for the government’s standing to protect the fairness and in65
tegrity of its own judicial process. Whether the prevention of discriminatory acquittal constitutes a community-wide good or the protection of individual victims, it represents an important step in the
Court’s desire for a justice system free of race and gender prejudice.
The ruling in McCollum would have been much more convincing,
66
however, had it recognized the real issues at stake. In order for
prosecutors to assert third-party standing to protect victims against
unlawful discrimination, they must demonstrate: (1) serious obstacles preventing the victims from asserting their own rights; (2) injury-in-fact to the victim seeking third-party standing; and (3) a suffi-

62
63
64

65
66

1993 WL 449264; Reply Brief for the Petitioner, McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992) (No. 91372), 1992 WL 541450.
McCollum, 505 U.S. at 59.
Id. at 49.
Id. (citing Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory Challenges, and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 195–96 (1989)) (using evidence of rioting following two Miami trials in which black jurors were peremptorily struck
by white defendants accused of a racial beating to demonstrate of the necessity of “public
confidence in the integrity of the criminal justice system” in order to maintain the peace
in racially charged trials).
McCollum, 505 U.S. at 56.
The dissenters lambasted the majority for trumping the rights of criminal defendants to
use peremptory challenges as they choose, with the seemingly less important right of the
public to confidence in the system and rights of jurors against unstated race consciousness. Id. at 68–69 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). The majority did not assert the rights of
black people to serve on juries, which poses interesting questions of the nature of jury
service as governance, but instead claimed that jurors are injured by the racial stereotyping of peremptory challenges. Id. at 48–50.
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cient nexus between the interest of the litigant and the victim to as67
sure vigorous advocacy of the victim’s rights.
Because our bilateral criminal justice system all but excludes victims from the criminal justice process, the first requirement of “se68
rious obstacles” is easily met. Victims cannot assert their own rights
to an impartial jury. The only procedural rights afforded to victims,
by federal and state statutes and by some state constitutions, are
rights to be present during proceedings and to speak at bond hear69
70
ings and sentencings. None of these rights is self-executing. Victims clearly have no rights to participate in voir dire or jury selec71
tion.
The second requirement of injury-in-fact could prove slightly
more difficult. Current doctrine does not recognize the injury suffered by victims when a guilty attacker is set free. Courts do not even
recognize that victims suffer injury when a convicted defendant fails
to pay restitution, holding instead that it is society as a whole that is
harmed by the failure to properly penalize and rehabilitate the de72
fendant.
In the equal protection context, however, the Court proves quite
willing to recognize injury when participants in the criminal justice
67

68

69

70

71

72

See Barbara D. Underwood, Ending Race Discrimination in Jury Selection: Whose Right Is It,
Anyway?, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 725, 756 (1992) (applying third-party standing as it pertains
to jurors).
See Anne M. Morgan, Criminal Law—Victims Rights: Remembering the “Forgotten Person” in the Criminal Justice System, 70 MARQ. L. REV. 572, 572 (1987) (citing Marlene A.
Young, Victims of Crime: The Great American Scandal, JUDGES’ J., Spring 1984, at 8; Lois
Haight Herrington, Victims of Crime: What the Government Can Do, JUDGES’ J., Spring
1984, at 17) (indicating that the devaluation of the victim’s role in the criminal justice
process has been coined the “Great American Scandal”).
See generally Walker A. Matthews, III, Note, Proposed Victims’ Rights Amendment: Ethical Considerations for the Prudent Prosecutor, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 735 (1998) (describing various state and federal approaches to the expansion of victims’ rights).
Bennett L. Gershman, Prosecutorial Ethics and Victims’ Rights: The Prosecutor’s Duty of Neutrality, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 559, 559–60 (2005); Susan Bandes, Victim Standing, 1999
UTAH L. REV. 331, 337 (1999) (“If additional litigants, such as victims, have a stake in this
process . . . they must rely on the prosecutor to represent adequately their interests for
them.”). As an example, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of victim impact
statements at sentencing as relevant information to the court and of healing power to the
victim. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 821–25 (1991). Yet, victims have no right to
make such a statement if the prosecutor chooses not to present the testimony. Bandes,
supra, at 341.
Bandes, supra note 70, at 337 (“The adversary system, in a criminal case, assumes only two
parties: the government and the defendant.”); FED. R. CRIM. P. 24 (providing that peremptory challenges are available only to the defendant and to the government); see cases
cited supra note 74.
Bandes, supra note 70, at 339 (“The punishment for the justly convicted inures to the
good of the polity.”).
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system suffer racial and gender discrimination, even in the absence of
underlying substantive rights. For example, while victims have no
right to prosecution of their cases, victims do have the right to chal73
lenge charging decisions motivated by the race of the victim. No
individual has a right to serve on a particular trial jury; yet, the Court
has given both prosecutors and defense lawyers third-party standing
in order to protect jurors from suffering from racial and gender ste74
reotyping.
Increasingly, racial stereotyping itself seems to create the requisite
injury to produce standing, even in the absence of any particularized
harm. In the Batson line of cases, the Court relied in part on injury to
potential jurors allegedly arising from the prosecutor’s unspoken mo75
tives for exercising peremptory challenges. Similarly, in Shaw v. Reno, the Court granted standing to voters who claimed that their congressional district line might have been drawn in an awkward shape
76
based on racial stereotypes about voting behavior. Surely a crime
victim whose attacker is set free because the jury chooses to discriminate against the victim’s race or gender suffers a more palpable and
serious injury.
Moreover, since Georgia v. McCollum held that the perception of
unfairness is worthy of prosecutorial standing, surely the reality of unfairness should also qualify. It would be ironic if the prosecutor
charging Los Angeles Police Department officers with beating Rodney King could not act to protect King himself from injustice, but only to protect against the perception of injustice and the possibility of
public unrest.

73

74

75

76

Compare Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973) (denying standing to citizens
challenging the underenforcement of criminal law), with United States v. Armstrong, 517
U.S. 456, 458 (1996) (allowing standing to respondents asserting a discriminatory effect
of criminal prosecution).
See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 146 (1994) (holding defendant has standing to assert the rights of potential jurors against gender discrimination); Georgia v.
McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 55 (1992) (holding prosecutors have third-party standing to assert the rights of potential jurors); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97 (1986) (holding
defendant has standing to assert the rights of potential jurors).
Batson, 476 U.S. at 121 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (noting when racial stereotypes are exercised as silent peremptory challenges, they avoid the overt “trafficking in the core of
truth in most common stereotypes” that would cause offense (quoting Barbara Allen
Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving “Its Wonderful Power”, 27 STAN. L. REV. 545, 553 (1975))).
The Court did not rely on any right to serve on a jury, but instead relied upon the harm
resulting from racial stereotyping. Batson, 476 U.S. at 87.
509 U.S. 630, 646 (1993) (holding that the given reapportionment scheme was prima
facie irrational and could only be understood as an attempt to segregate voters into districts on the basis of race and that such an attempt was without sufficient justification).
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Finally, prosecutors must show a sufficient nexus between their interests and the victims’ rights to assure a vigorous advocacy on their
behalf. This requirement is easily met because the “State’s interest in
every trial is to see that the proceedings are carried out in a fair, im77
partial, and nondiscriminatory manner.” For the reasons described
immediately below, I believe there can be no conflict between the
prosecutor’s obligation to the defendant, to the public, and to race
78
and gender-neutral justice for the victim. The rights at stake are collective rather than individual, and concern the systemic reputation
and fairness of the criminal jury system. Equal protection rights are
better protected through the government’s broad obligation to do
justice.
B. Preventing Discriminatory Acquittal Falls Squarely Within a Prosecutor’s
Ethical Obligation to Do Justice
The ethical role of a prosecutor is not to represent victims as
79
clients, nor for that matter, to represent the government itself. Instead prosecutors have the ethical duty, unique among lawyers, to do
80
“justice” rather than to advocate the interests of a particular client.
The Supreme Court famously described the role of a prosecutor as a
“representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as
81
its obligation to govern at all.” Ethical prosecutors do not solely
consider the interests of individual crime victims: they are obligated

77
78

79

80

81

J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 137 n.8.
Morgan, supra note 68, at 591 (citing Nat’l Judicial Coll. Victims’ Rights Conference Participants, Victims of Crime: What Judges and Lawyers Can Do, JUDGES’ J., Spring 1984, at 12,
13 (contending that victims’ rights “can be accomplished without impairing the constitutional and statutory safeguards appropriately afforded all persons charged with crime”)).
See State ex rel. Romley v. Superior Court, 891 P.2d 246, 250 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (“[A]
prosecutor does not ‘represent’ the victim in a criminal trial; therefore, the victim is not a
‘client’ of the prosecutor.”); ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PROSECUTION, &
DEFENSE FUNCTION § 3-3.2 cmt. (1993) (“[T]he prosecutor’s client is not the victim but
the people who live in the prosecutor’s jurisdiction.”); Carol A. Corrigan, Commentary,
On Prosecutorial Ethics, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 537, 537 (1986) (“The prosecutor does
not represent the victim of a crime, the police, or any individual. Instead, the prosecutor
represents society as a whole.”).
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. (1983) (“A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate.”); MODEL CODE OF PROF’L
RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13(3) (2004) (stating that prosecutors must “seek justice”); see also
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PROSECUTION FUNCTION & DEFENSE FUNCTION § 31.2(c) (1993) (“The duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice, not merely to convict.”).
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
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to protect the fair functioning of the system, including, for that mat82
ter, the defendant’s rights.
This distinction frequently matters. Prosecutors face ethical dilemmas in balancing the interests of the community against the interests of a particular victim, and against the collective interests of vic83
tims. Domestic violence cases present archetypal examples of when
those interests diverge and provide a context relevant for our consideration of discriminatory acquittal. Victims of domestic violence often ask a prosecutor to drop charges out of rational calculations for
84
their own safety and survival. Prosecutors then must decide whether
to honor victims’ wishes, while balancing the safety of this particular
victim against the deterrent effect of prosecution against the defen85
More difficult still, prosecutors must balance the
dant batterer.
safety of a particular victim against the deterrent effect of prosecution
on all batterers, thus trading off the safety of a particular victim
86
against the safety of all future victims. In the course of these agonizing decisions, prosecutors frequently and explicitly elevate the inter87
ests of the community over the interests of a victim.
I do not propose that prosecutors represent the specific interests
of victims as they would a client, but instead that they represent the
far more collective rights of victims to equal protection of the law.
Fighting for the rights of victims to verdicts free from race or gender
discrimination cannot create a conflict of interest. Equal protection
88
of the law fits too squarely within our definition of “justice.”

82

83
84

85

86
87

88

  

See Matthews, supra note 69, at 741 (1998) (noting that prosecutors must consider “1)
liberty and due process; 2) public order and safety; and 3) governmental efficiency and
economy”).
See Gershman, supra note 70, at 561 (evaluating the changing role of victims in the criminal justice system).
See Casey G. Gwinn & Anne O’Dell, Stopping the Violence: The Role of the Police Officer and the
Prosecutor, 20 W. ST. U. L. REV. 297, 298, 308–09 (1993) (describing how prosecutors are
starting to focus on the long-term accountability for the abuser). See generally Cheryl
Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic Violence Prosecutions,
109 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1996) (exploring a system where victims must proceed with
charges despite their own fears and concerns).
The stakes are high. The Los Angeles District Attorney’s office, for example, made the
decision to honor Nicole Brown Simpson’s desires to drop domestic violence charges
against her husband O.J. Simpson. Hanna, supra note 84, at 1850–51.
Id.
Failure to do so can constitute an ethics violation. See Gershman, supra note 70, at 561
(describing the risk of ethical violations when prosecutors elevate interests of the victim
in vengeance against the defendant’s rights, or against broader public interest in offering
a plea bargain to reward cooperation).
See Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power and Privilege of Discretion, 67 FORDHAM
L. REV. 13, 52 (1998) (arguing that prosecutors have duties to protect the community,
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The Supreme Court has made clear time and time again that discrimination anywhere in a trial is anathema to the precepts of our trial system.
[T]he injury caused by the discrimination is made more severe because
the government permits it to occur within the courthouse itself. Few
places are a more real expression of the constitutional authority of the
government than a courtroom, where the law itself unfolds . . . [and
89
where] juries render verdicts . . . .

The Court also has rejected the argument that “gender discrimination . . . , unlike racial discrimination, is tolerable in the courtroom,”
even though gender classifications receive only intermediate scrutiny
90
under the Equal Protection Clause. A just criminal justice system is
one that does not operate based on race or gender of the participants. As such, the obligation to prevent verdicts based on unconstitutional discrimination cannot conflict with the obligation to do justice. The Court tasks all of the participants in the criminal justice
91
system with the obligation to protect against such discrimination.
Obligation does not equate to willingness, so it is also important
to ask the pragmatic question of whether prosecutors will care
enough about the equal protection rights of victims to fulfill this responsibility. Indeed, empirical studies evidence race-of-the-victim bi92
as in charging decisions made by prosecutors. Studies also show bias against charging gender-based violence depending on the
93
perceived virtue of the female victim. Prosecutors too often exhibit
internal bias or the willingness to anticipate the bias of juries, or
both, so it might seem strange to vest them with responsibility of
fighting discriminatory acquittal. After all, jury discrimination is a
mere subset of the discriminatory underenforcement of the law. Before a case ever gets to a jury, police officers and prosecutors exercise
great discretion about whether to make an arrest, whether to charge

89
90
91

92

93

and to “ensure that victims and defendants in the criminal justice system are treated fairly, equitably and in a nondiscriminatory manner”).
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 628 (1991).
J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 135 (1994).
See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 88–89 (1986) (“[T]he State may not draw up its jury
lists pursuant to neutral procedures but then resort to discrimination at ‘other stages in
the selection process . . . .’”).
See Martha A. Myers & John Hagan, Private and Public Trouble: Prosecutors and the Allocation
of Court Resources, 26 SOC. PROBS. 439, 446 (1979) (finding that when a victim was white,
prosecutors were more likely to pursue the highest available charge in a leading statistical
study conducted to determine whether prosecutors consider race when determining
whether to proceed with the most severe charges found).
See Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1130 (1986) (describing the archaic theorem
that a “truly unwilling woman would fight nearly to the death to protect her virtue”).
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94

a defendant, and whether to allow him to plead guilty before trial.
Law enforcement officials prove far more likely to bring charges for
violence against a white victim or for gender-based violence against a
95
“virtuous” woman.
But when prosecutors do bring charges in cases made difficult by
the possibility of jury discrimination, we should give them the tools
they need to counter it. The prosecutors brave enough to bring the
killers of Emmett Till and Medgar Evars to trial deserved a constitu96
tional foothold to describe the importance of their uphill battles. At
the moment, prosecutors can rely on nothing more than the trial
judge’s sense of relative fairness and relevance.
Moreover, once a case goes to trial, prosecutors, like all lawyers,
97
have a psychological incentive to win. Much more than charging
and plea-bargaining decisions, which most often occur in safe obscurity, prosecutors perceive trials as a public measure of their personal
98
ability. Imbuing the right to protect victims with prosecutors would
harness the power of self-interest to help prosecutors root out jury bias against victims. Prosecutors might require better training to perform this obligation well, but they would have a great incentive to do
so.
It also would create an important normative change to task prosecutors with the explicit role of protecting the equal protection rights
94

95

96

97

98

See Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzalez, 545 U.S. 748, 760–61 (2005) (describing the constitutional necessity of police discretion); United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464
(1996) (describing the importance of prosecutorial discretion as a separation of powers
issue).
Kennedy, supra note 5, at 29–75. See Estrich, supra note 93, at 1087–89 (sharing a story
about how officers treated the “virtuous” author following her own rape); Pokorak, supra
note 6, at 39–40 (highlighting the typical differences in the women raped and the jurors
who decide their cases); Myers & Hagan, supra note 92, at 446 (describing a study showing prosecutorial bias based on race of victims).
See Tetlow, supra note 3, at 82–84. Often these were federal prosecutors, who may or may
not have come from the communities in which the murders occurred, but in the cases of
Emmett Till and Medgar Evers, Mississippi district attorneys brought the cases to trial. See
ORR KLOPFER, supra note 2; ADAM NOSSITER, OF LONG MEMORY: MISSISSIPPI AND THE
MURDER OF MEDGAR EVERS (1994). In 1933, Professor James Chadbourn estimated that
less than 1% of lynchings since 1900 resulted in a conviction. JAMES HARMON
CHADBOURN, LYNCHING AND THE LAW 13–14 (1933).
See Tracey L. Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior: Influencing Prosecutorial Discretion and Conduct with Financial Incentives, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 851, 882 (1995) (describing the “desire
to ‘win’” as a central characteristic of prosecutorial culture); Daniel S. Medwed, The Zeal
Deal: Prosecutorial Resistance to Post-Conviction Claims of Innocence, 84 B.U. L. REV. 125, 134,
138 (2004) (noting the emphasis district attorneys’ offices place on conviction rates).
Kenneth Bresler, Essay, “I Never Lost a Trial”: When Prosecutors Keep Score of Criminal Convictions, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 537, 541 (1996) (criticizing prosecutors who keep personal
tallies for self-promotion).
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of victims. At the moment, both police and prosecutors unabashedly
use the specter of jury discrimination to legitimate their own antic99
If juries probably will not convict for viipatory discrimination.
olence against certain kinds of victims, then law enforcement will ex100
pend fewer resources bringing such cases.
The result is that
minority communities are less protected, and women are subject to
101
epidemic rates of rape and domestic violence.
Acknowledging discriminatory acquittal, and tasking prosecutors with battling it, will
send prosecutors a very different message about the illegitimacy of
anticipating jury discrimination. Granting prosecutors new procedural tools of constitutional priority would go a long way to communicating the urgency of the task.
C. Prosecutors Should Root Out Jury Discrimination Rather than Judges
Perhaps we could avoid any issue of granting equal protection
rights and obligations to prosecutors by instead imbuing the obligation with the court. Unlike other procedural trial rights, voir dire often falls within the purview of the trial judge. Clearly the judge already has responsibility for ensuring fundamental fairness and an
102
Investing the court with this power would make
impartial jury.
clear that the rights at stake are systemic, concerned with preserving
the sanctity of the process. During jury selection, for example, we
could ask the trial judge to voir dire about discriminatory attitudes
and act on the results with dismissal of jurors biased against either defendant or victim.
Leaving such voir dire only to judges, however, would prove con103
First, studies
siderably less effective than granting it to lawyers.
show potential jurors are more likely to lie and to give the seemingly
104
correct answer to judges as authority figures.
They do not want to

99
100
101
102

103
104

See Davis, supra note 88, at 25–32, 53.
Pokorak, supra note 6, at 49.
Kennedy, supra note 5, at 69–75.
Mark W. Bennett, Unraveling the Gordian Knot of Implicit Bias in Jury Selection: The
Problems of Judge-Dominated Voir Dire, the Failed Promise of Batson, and Proposed Solutions, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 149, 157 (2010).
Colbert, supra note 22, at 121 n.584 (“For jury selection to be meaningful, the defense
attorney must conduct the voir dire.”).
See Bennett, supra note 102, at 160 (describing his experience as a district court judge
receiving answers from jurors); Susan E. Jones, Judge-Versus Attorney-Conducted Voir Dire:
An Empirical Investigation of Juror Candor, 11 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 131 (1987); Linda L.
Marshall & Althea Smith, The Effects of Demand Characteristics, Evaluation Anxiety, and Expectancy on Juror Honesty During Voir Dire, 120 J. PSYCHOL. 205, 214 (1986).
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embarrass themselves by giving the wrong answer to an apparently
105
moral question, often in an extremely public setting.
More importantly, as described above, granting the responsibility
to prosecutors harnesses the power of self-interest. Prosecutors have
more incentive to ask voir dire questions well, in subtle ways designed
to illicit information relevant to peremptory challenges, rather than
106
the more rhetorical questioning common to judicial voir dire.
There is a big difference between a judge who asks jurors to raise
their hand if they are incapable of being fair, compared to a lawyer’s
ability to inquire, in the course of individualized questioning, how a
107
juror feels about particular race or gender signifiers.
D. Why Not Give Victims Direct Participation?
Should victims themselves be permitted to participate in trials to
protect their own rights? It is a question serious enough to be taken
108
Victims and their counsel
up by the Supreme Court recently.
would likely prove more effective at directly rebutting the discrimina109
tion that leads to jury nullification.
The direct presence of victims
110
in the proceedings might combat a discriminatory lack of empathy.
Victims of gender-based crimes could more directly rebut attacks on
111
their character for failing to meet expected gender roles. Allowing
victims to participate could give voice to the voiceless, and remind juries to contemplate the rights of victims to equal protection of the
112
law.
105

106
107
108

109

110

111
112

  

The possibility of public embarrassment can be alleviated by the more frequent use of
jury questionnaires rather than just public questioning. These are no substitute for more
individualized follow-up questions, but they do provide a different type of opportunity for
jurors to more privately admit or hint at bias.
Bennett, supra note 102, at 160 (noting that lawyers know their cases better, have greater
access to jury consultants, and generally do a better job than judges at voir dire).
See id.
In the last decade, there have been numerous proposals to expand the procedural rights
of victims, including a proposed victim’s rights amendment to the Constitution. None of
these proposals, however, suggests the kind of direct trial participation necessary to guard
against discriminatory acquittal. See Matthews, supra note 69.
William T. Pizzi, Victims’ Rights: Rethinking Our “Adversary System”, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 349,
355 (1999) (noting that in Germany, sexual assault victims take an interest in participating at trial through counsel; as character and credibility are likely to come under attack
by the defendant, victims feel as if their stakes in the trial are high).
Id. at 357 (recounting a “hotly contested” rape trial where an admitted drug addict
claimed she had been raped by two defendants who insisted that she had agreed to have
sex with them on the promise that they would give her heroin the following day).
See id.
See, e.g., Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973) (stating that historically, a citizen lacked standing to contest policies of prosecutors if he were neither subject to prose-
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Many civil law systems around the world permit the direct participation of victims in criminal trials. Countries such as Germany and
France allow victims to question witnesses and make closing argu113
Civilian judges,
ments, using their own counsel if they choose.
however, actively supervise the actual investigation, rather than refe114
As
ree an entirely bilateral battle between state and defendant.
such, judges consider a much broader array of evidence and can invite participation by third parties without the same claims of preju115
dice.
Even our own criminal justice system originally allowed the direct
participation of victims, not as third parties, but as “private prosecutors.” Most of the American colonies initially followed the English
116
States
tradition of allowing victims to prosecute their own cases.
did not invest prosecutorial authority in a public prosecutor until the
end of the eighteenth century, and private prosecution continued in
117
Today, a number
many areas throughout the nineteenth century.

113

114

115
116

117

cution nor threatened with prosecution); Bandes, supra note 70, at 347 (urging a broader
definition of standing for victims, particularly those protecting their equal protection
rights, but noting the “cynical conclusion” that “the only collective interest cognizable is
the government’s own definition of its own interests, which it buttresses when necessary
by claiming to represent victims or society as a whole”).
Victims and their counsel may question witnesses and make closing arguments. See Pizzi,
supra note 109, at 358. Civilian systems often allow victims and their attorneys to stand
beside prosecutors and defense lawyers, to question witnesses and to give closing arguments. See Renée Lettow Lerner, The Intersection of Two Systems: An American on Trial for an
American Murder in the French Cour d’Assises, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 791, 819–22 (2001);
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE SYSTEMS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 17–18 (Christine Van Den
Wyngaert et al. eds., 1993); R.L. Jones, Victims of Crime in France, 158 JUST. PEACE & LOC.
GOV’T L. 795, 795–96 (1994); William T. Pizzi & Luca Marafioti, The New Italian Code of
Criminal Procedure: The Difficulties of Building an Adversarial Trial System on a Civil Law
Foundation, 17 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 14 (1992) (stating that in Italy, injured persons are entitled to participate as parties to criminal cases from pretrial to appeal). In Germany, victim participation is allowed in cases very personal to victims or their families. William T.
Pizzi & Walter Perron, Crime Victims in German Courtrooms: A Comparative Perspective on
American Problems, 32 STAN. J. INT’L L. 37, 54–55 (1996).
Pizzi & Perron, supra note 113, at 54–55; Bandes, supra note 70, at 337 (noting that a direct role for victims could not “be so easily grafted onto our system as currently structured”). Inquisitorial systems are far more directed towards truth-telling, using judges in
an investigative role to flesh out all of the relevant facts without strict evidentiary exclusion. This more comfortably allows victims to speak directly to the court. Id. at 337–38.
See Pizzi, supra note 109, at 358.
See John D. Bessler, The Public Interest and the Unconstitutionality of Private Prosecutors, 47
ARK. L. REV. 511, 515–21 (1994) (discussing the historical development of prosecution);
Matthews, supra note 69, at 736–37 (describing the American divergence from the English approach, allowing greater protection of defendant’s rights but at the expense of victims’ rights).
Matthews, supra note 69, at 737.
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of jurisdictions allow some form of private prosecution, usually as to
118
minor crimes.
With a few exceptions, the modern version of private prosecution
permits victim’s counsel to participate alongside the public prosecu119
tor.
Unlike civil law systems, private prosecution envisions the victim as a replacement of sorts for the prosecutor, rather than as a
120
third party representing her own interests. It is precisely this blurring of roles that has given the Supreme Court and many scholars
121
concern about the constitutionality of private prosecution.
The fundamental differences between the ethical duties of a prosecutor and of a lawyer with a private client create potential conflicts
122
The public prosecutor is vested with the obligation to
of interest.
123
do justice, not to seek retribution on behalf of any particular victim.
States have attempted to solve this problem by investing the private
prosecutor with the same ethical obligations of the public prosecutor,
but that simply exacerbates the conflict of interest between that attorney’s actual client, the victim, and a prosecutor’s obligation to do
124
justice more broadly defined.

118
119
120
121

122

123
124

See Bessler, supra note 116, at 529; Matthew S. Nichols, No One Can Serve Two Masters: Arguments Against Private Prosecutors, 13 CAP. DEF. J. 279, 282 (2001).
See Pizzi, supra note 109, at 350–53.
See generally Bessler, supra note 116.
See Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton, 481 U.S. 787, 802 (1987) (holding that civil attorneys were precluded from serving as private prosecution in a criminal contempt proceeding arising out of the same civil case because this dual representation created a conflict of interest but not concluding that private prosecution is per se unconstitutional); see
Nichols, supra note 118, at 289–91; see also Bessler, supra note 116, at 558 (“Because private prosecutors have financial incentives that public prosecutors do not, and because
private prosecutors create, at the very least, an appearance of impropriety, private prosecutors violate defendants’ due process rights.”).
Many of these concerns about conflicts focus on the attorneys who represent victims both
in private prosecutions and in civil cases in which the attorney may directly benefit. See
Jones v. Richards, 776 F.2d 1244, 1247 (4th Cir. 1985) (“[U]se of private prosecutors who
are also representing plaintiffs in civil actions against the criminal defendant should be
discouraged . . . .”); Nichols, supra note 118, at 281. One could ban this practice, however, and still allow victims to employ independent counsel to represent them solely in the
criminal proceeding. Several states have done so. See Bessler, supra note 116, at 530.
See supra Part II.B.
See New Jersey v. Imperiale, 773 F. Supp. 747, 748 (D.N.J. 1991) (finding a conflict of interest for a private citizen pursuant to state rule to initiate and prosecute assault charges);
Woods v. Linahan, 648 F.2d 973, 977 (5th Cir. 1981) (expressing “concern about the
practice of using a private attorney, paid by family and friends of the victim, to prosecute
persons accused of murdering a person dear to the people paying the private prosecutor[,]” though rejecting the argument that use of a private prosecutor requires reversal);
see also Nichols, supra note 118, at 293–94 (discussing conflict of interest); Bessler, supra
note 116, at 542–71 (arguing that due process forbids use of private prosecutors because
of inherent conflicts).
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In 2010, the Supreme Court came tantalizingly close to addressing
the issue of a private prosecution by a domestic violence victim in the
125
The Court granted
case of Robertson v. United States ex rel. Watson.
certiorari in the case to consider whether the victim of domestic violence could prosecute the defendant for criminal contempt for vi126
olation of a civil restraining order. The victim proceeded over the
objections of the federal prosecutor, who had previously worked out
a plea bargain with the defendant to punish him for an earlier as127
sault. Ultimately, however, a majority of the Court decided that the
relevant issues were not clearly presented by the facts of the case, and
128
the Court denied certiorari as “improvidently granted.”
Chief Justice Roberts wrote a twelve page dissent, joined by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Sotomayor, urging the Court to reject private
prosecution because “[o]ur entire criminal justice system is premised
on the notion that a criminal prosecution pits the government
against the governed, not one private citizen against another. The
ruling below [affirming the contempt conviction] is a startling repud129
Chief Justice Roberts quesiation of that basic understanding.”
tioned whether a victim bringing criminal contempt proceedings
would be subject to all of the constitutional criminal procedural requirements of a government prosecutor, including revealing exculpatory information or administering Miranda warnings before interview130
ing the defendant. Regardless of how the Court ultimately decides
this issue, it is clear that our adversarial system of criminal justice
does not comfortably allow for private prosecution, even in the context of contempt proceedings of a civil order.
I do not believe that a drastic expansion of victim participation in
all criminal trials is desirable or necessary. As a practical matter, requiring victims to enforce their own equal protection rights within
the criminal justice system by hiring private lawyers would have li131
mited impact.
Most victims cannot and would not pursue hiring a
125

126
127
128
129
130
131

  

See Robertson v. United States ex rel. Watson, 130 S. Ct. 2184, 2185 (2010) (dismissing writ
of certiorari as improvidently granted in a case questioning whether an action for criminal contempt in a congressionally-created court cannot be brought in the name and pursuant to the power of a private person).
Id. at 2185–86 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 2185.
Id.; Justice Stephen Breyer, Lecture before the Tulane Law School Summer Program at
Cambridge University (July 12, 2010).
Robertson, 130 S. Ct. at 2188 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 2187–88.
See Pizzi & Perron, supra note 113, at 55 n.76 (stating that in the German civil law legal
system, victim participation was only 19.2% in cases where victims were eligible to participate); see also Pizzi, supra note 109, at 355 (stating that German crime victims rarely wish
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private prosecutor for the very reasons they do not pursue the civil
132
tort remedies already available to them. Victims fail to find lawyers
to represent them even for tort cases that come with financial remedies, and also find such cases too dangerously provocative against a
133
violent perpetrator.
More importantly, requiring resources to obtain equal protection
of the law is anathema to our criminal justice system. We have already traveled too far down the road of private policing in wealthy
communities, allocating the resources of law enforcement according
134
to the ability to pay. We should not start privatizing prosecution for
135
those who can afford it.
The risk of discriminatory acquittal does not occur in every case
involving a victim, and the inclusion of individual victims in trials
would be an unwieldy attempt to address the issue. Instead, the prosecutor is well-placed to enforce the rights of victims to race-neutral,
136
or gender-neutral, justice as part of our existing system.
III. GIVING PROSECUTORS CONSTITUTIONAL PROCEDURES TO ROOT
OUT UNLAWFUL DISCRIMINATION DURING JURY SELECTION
Jury selection lies at the center of the constitutional criminal procedures designed to protect defendants’ equal protection rights, efforts that have always relied more on preventive procedures than on
137
direct remedies.
Though defendants can appeal and seek reversal
of discriminatory verdicts (unlike prosecutors), as a practical matter,
sexism and racism on the part of jurors is almost impossible to

132
133
134

135

136

137

to participate in the trial, relying instead on the state’s attorneys and judges to reach a
fair verdict and sentence).
Bessler, supra note 116, at 586–87.
See ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN & FEMINIST LAWMAKING 94–95 (2000)
(describing the danger of bringing tort suits for domestic violence injuries).
See M. Rhead Enion, Note, Constitutional Limits on Private Policing and the State’s Allocation of
Force, 59 DUKE L.J. 519, 519 (2009) (describing the ubiquitous use of private police forces
and resulting constitutional concerns).
See Nichols, supra note 118, at 286–87 (stating that transforming the role of the “public
prosecutor into a pure advocate and representative of the crime victim” with privatization
is “contrary to our entire system of criminal justice”).
Indeed, the equal protection rights of victims necessarily involve a more collective form
of justice, as in the rights of women and minorities against systematic devaluation and as
subject to sanctioned private violence. It has always proved awkward in antidiscrimination law to present collective equality as an individual right. See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Groups
and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 108 (1976).
See Tetlow, supra note 3, at 102–03 (stating that jury discrimination is difficult to prove
and measure, and therefore “[c]ourts may have no choice about relying on procedure
and prevention rather than regulating the results and the accuracy of jury deliberations”).
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138

prove.
Instead, the Court created much of constitutional criminal
139
In
procedure in order to prevent discriminatory jury convictions.
McCleskey v. Kemp, the Court overtly acknowledged the cynical truth
that “[t]here is, of course, some risk of racial prejudice influencing a
jury’s decision in a criminal case. . . . The question is ‘at what point
140
that risk becomes constitutionally unacceptable.’” The Court threw
its hands up at proving or curing discrimination after the fact, and in141
stead hoped to prevent jury discrimination through procedures.
To prevent verdicts based on racial or gender discrimination, the
Court understandably focuses on jury selection. After a biased jury is
chosen and seated, even the most carefully conducted trial in the
142
The Court governs jury disworld will not prevent discrimination.
138

139

140
141

142

  

McCleskey held that defendants must show discrimination in their specific jury’s deliberations and cannot rely on statistical evidence of an increased likelihood of discrimination.
481 U.S. 279, 292–97. Modern discrimination often remains unspoken, and almost always
remains hidden within the secrecy governing jury deliberations. See id. at 296–97. See generally Janet C. Hoeffel, Risking the Eighth Amendment: Arbitrariness, Juries, and Discretion in
Capital Cases, 46 B.C. L. REV. 771, 772–73 (2005) (arguing for an amendment of jury
secrecy rules in capital cases to prevent against prejudicial and erroneous decision making). Jury secrecy has been justified on several policy grounds: (1) preserving the finality
of verdicts from speculation about jury deliberations; (2) deference for the jury’s role as
fact-finder, a role that would be challenged if judges could simply substitute their own
judgments; (3) avoiding the harassment of jurors after a verdict; (4) fostering free and
open deliberations by jurors without concern for future embarrassment; and (5) preserving public confidence in the jury, by hiding the quality of deliberations from the public.
Id. at 806–13.
See generally Michael J. Klarman, The Racial Origins of Modern Criminal Procedure, 99 MICH.
L. REV. 48 (2000); Scott W. Howe, The Troubling Influence of Equality in Constitutional Criminal Procedure: From Brown to Miranda, Furman and Beyond, 54 VAND. L. REV. 359
(2001). For examples of the Court’s superficial treatment of the racial issues at stake, see,
for example, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 457 (1966) (referring to the defendants as
an “indigent Mexican defendant” and an “indigent Los Angeles Negro”); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 281 (1936) (quoting Brown v. State, 161 So. 465, 470 (Miss. 1935)
(noting the lower court’s description of the defendants as “all ignorant negroes”); Powell
v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 49 (1932) (“The petitioners . . . are negroes charged with the
crime of rape . . . of two white girls.”).
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 308–09 (1987) (quoting Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28,
36 n.8 (1986)).
See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 309 (citing Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85 (1986) (proclaiming a ban on the racial use of peremptory challenges)); Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S.
474, 511 n.8 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]he jury system and the fair-cross-section
principle were designed to eliminate any discrimination in the imposition of sentence
based on race of the victim.”).
For example, in the Scottsboro boys cases, the Supreme Court twice reversed the convictions of nine African American boys falsely accused of raping two white women on a train,
eight of whom were sentenced to death. The Court continued to create new procedures
designed to limit the impact of jury discrimination, yet Alabama juries continued to convict the defendants after each remand. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53, 56 (1932)
(finding that defendants received inadequate counsel when every lawyer in the county
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crimination in multiple ways: it bans the exclusion of minorities and
143
women from the jury pool; it gives defendants the right to voir dire
144
potential jurors about potential discrimination; and it bans the racial or gendered use of peremptory challenges by lawyers during jury
145
selection.
In interesting and sometimes contradictory ways, the
Court strives for jury diversity, governs juror impartiality, and regu146
lates the motives of lawyers picking juries.
While the Court has never granted prosecutors the right to ferret
147
out jury discrimination against victims, Georgia v. McCollum did

143

144

145

146

147

was jointly appointed to represent them); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 599 (1935)
(reversing a defendant’s conviction because all blacks were excluded from the jury). See
generally DAN T. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO: A TRAGEDY OF THE AMERICAN SOUTH (1979) (presenting another instance in which biased jurors continued to convict the defendants).
See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310, 312 (1880) (banning exclusion of blacks
from jury venire); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975) (banning exclusion of women).
Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 594, 598 (1976) (holding that “the demands of due process
could be satisfied by [the defendant’s] more generalized but thorough inquiry into the
impartiality of the veniremen”).
See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 84 (1986) (affirming the principle that a “State’s
purposeful or deliberate denial to Negroes on account of race of participation as jurors in
the administration of justice violates the Equal Protection Clause” (internal quotation
marks omitted)); see also Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 402 (1991) (holding that “a criminal defendant may object to race-based exclusions of jurors effected through peremptory
challenges whether or not the defendant and the excluded jurors share the same race”);
Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59 (1992) (holding that “the Constitution prohibits a
criminal defendant from engaging in purposeful discrimination on the ground of race in
the exercise of peremptory challenges”).
As I argue in a forthcoming article, the Supreme Court has three constitutional procedural mechanisms to serve the Sixth Amendment purposes of an “impartial jury” as informed by the Equal Protection Clause’s guarantee of a jury unbiased by race or gender.
See Tania Tetlow, Why Batson Misses the Point, 97 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2012). First,
the Court focuses on rooting out individual bias in jurors through voir dire and the use of
challenges. Ristaino, 424 U.S. at 595 (explaining that judge-directed voir dire is part of
“the State’s obligation to the defendant to impanel an impartial jury”). Second, the
Court uses diversity as a proxy for impartiality, for example, guaranteeing a jury pool chosen from a “fair cross section of the community.” Taylor, 419 U.S. at 526–27. Finally, and
most confusingly, the Batson rule regulates discrimination against potential jurors. Batson,
476 U.S. 89. Despite the fact that courts and scholars focus most obsessively on this last
principle, it proves the least connected to the goal of an impartial and nondiscriminatory
jury. See Tetlow, supra.
The Court’s Sixth Amendment protections against banning women and minorities from
the jury pool have the effect of protecting both victims and defendants. Though the right
to challenge exclusions from the jury pool belongs to the defendant and not the prosecutor, such challenges have long since resulted in an inclusive pool that benefits both sides.
See Roger Allan Ford, Modeling the Effects of Peremptory Challenges on Jury Selection and Jury
Verdicts, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 377, 378–79 (2010) (“[P]eremptory challenges are beneficial when used properly—that is, when based on factors that legitimately may affect or
indicate a juror’s view of the evidence or willingness to vote for one side or the other—
because they help ensure an impartial jury, a right protected by the Sixth Amendment.”).
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create one procedural right that unintentionally protects against discriminatory acquittal. It gave prosecutors the constitutional right to
object to the racial use of peremptory challenges by defense law148
As described above, this provides a starting point and some
yers.
precedent for the rights I urge. Yet the case proves less useful than it
should because the Court chose shakier foundations than the battle
against discriminatory acquittal. The Court worried more about the
public’s confidence in the appearance of equality rather than the vic149
tim’s substantial interest in its reality.
Beyond peremptory challenges, I focus on more uncharted territory in the jury selection process. The right to ask potential jurors
questions during voir dire about bias remains one of the most impor150
tant, and often overlooked, protections against jury discrimination.
The Supreme Court frequently acknowledges the importance of voir
dire, yet strangely limits the constitutional right to inquire into bias,
instead leaving the scope of voir dire almost entirely to the discretion
151
I argue that the Court should strengthen the right
of trial judges.
to voir dire about bias, and apply it to protect against any verdict that
rests on illegal discrimination, whether conviction or acquittal.
A. Applying the Defendant’s Voir Dire Rights to Prosecutors to Protect Against
Discriminatory Acquittal
The process of voir dire, conducted before the exercise of peremptory challenges, is an enormously valuable and overlooked
152
source of jury regulation.
It is a source of profitable business for
jury consultants and obsession by trial lawyers, but because it falls
largely within the discretion of trial judges, it is the subject of few ap-

148

149

150

151
152

See McCollum, 505 U.S. at 59 (holding that “the Constitution prohibits a criminal defendant from engaging in purposeful discrimination on the ground of race in the exercise of
peremptory challenges”).
Id. at 49 (stating that “[s]election procedures that purposefully exclude African Americans from juries undermine [the] public confidence” and that “[t]he need for public
confidence is especially high in cases involving race-related crimes”).
See Richard J. Crawford & Daniel W. Patterson, Exploring and Expanding Voir Dire Boundaries: A Note to Judges and Trial Lawyers, 20 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 645, 662 (1997) (stating
that “[o]pening up the questioning process is likely to enhance the quality of juror
screening without doing violence to the fair trial ideal”); see generally Barbara Allen Babcock, supra note 75, at 549 (describing the importance of voir dire in rooting out potential discrimination).
See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 143–44 (1994) (recognizing the importance of voir dire); see also discussion of the limits on that right infra Parts III.A.1-2.
See Babcock, supra note 75, at 546; see also Crawford & Patterson, supra note 150, at 662.
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153

peals.
In the abstract, voir dire simply proves less interesting to
154
scholars than to lawyers who actually choose juries. Yet, I argue that
the breadth of voir dire on the subject of bias can do far more to im155
prove the impartiality of the jury than any Batson challenge.
1. Voir Dire on the Subject of Bias
Jury selection procedures strive for an impartial jury through a selection process designed to avoid the most biased extremes on either
156
side. First, the voir dire process collects information about individ157
ual jurors.
The judge then focuses on removing the most clearly
158
We then harness the self-interest of the
biased jurors “for cause.”
159
After
parties and ask each side to use dueling peremptory strikes.
this process of inquiry and winnowing, the first twelve are seated as
160
the trial jury.

153

154

155

156

157
158

159
160

  

See State v. Allred, 169 S.E.2d 833, 838 (N.C. 1969) (holding that a party is not allowed
appellate review of a trial court’s denial of a motion to strike a juror for cause unless the
party: (1) uses a peremptory challenge to strike the juror in question; (2) exhausts the
peremptory challenges allowed by statute; and (3) asserts its right to challenge peremptorily an additional juror).
But see John C. Reinard & Darin J. Arsenault, The Impact of Forms of Strategic and NonStrategic Voir Dire Questions on Jury Verdicts, 67 COMM. MONOGRAPHS 158, 158 (2000) (stating that “[s]cholars have dedicated time to isolate functions of voir dire questions”).
See Barat S. McClain, Note, Turner’s Acceptance of Limited Voir Dire Renders Batson’s Equal
Protection a Hollow Promise, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 273, 274–75, 306 (1989) (presenting the
idea that voir dire can be important to eliminating jury discrimination without violating
the essence of Batson’s prohibition on presuming such prejudice according to race); see
also Kimberly Wise, Comment, Peering Into the Judicial Magic Eight Ball: Arbitrary Decisions in
the Area of Juror Removal, 42 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 813, 815–17 (2009) (explaining that voir
dire is used to accomplish the “seemingly insurmountable task of providing an impartial
jury” and that “[t]he main purpose of voir dire is to ensure that the selected jury is impartial, meaning that it is unbiased and without prejudice”).
See Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 484 (1990) (quoting Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79,
91 (1986)) (“Peremptory challenges, by enabling each side to exclude those jurors it believes will be most partial toward the other side, are a means of ‘eliminat[ing] extremes of
partiality on both sides,’ thereby ‘assuring the selection of a qualified and unbiased
jury.’”).
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(a) (permitting attorneys to examine prospective jurors).
See Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985) (holding that the appropriate standard
for determining when a prospective juror may be excluded for cause is “whether the juror’s views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror
in accordance with his instructions and his oath,’” which “does not require that a juror’s
bias be proved with unmistakable clarity” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
See Ford, supra note 147, at 377 (“Attorneys try to shape jury selection by exercising peremptory [strikes].”).
See V. HALE STARR & MARK MCCORMICK, JURY SELECTION: AN ATTORNEY’S GUIDE TO JURY
LAW AND METHODS, 352 (2d ed. 1993) (discussing the benefits of judge-conducted voir
dire and the disadvantages of attorney-conducted voir dire). The Constitution also allows
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The process of questioning potential jurors about their backgrounds and beliefs occurs within the parameters set out by individual judges, and within the rules and traditions of their respective
161
The leeway that judges give to lawyers to suggest voir dire
courts.
162
questions, or to ask the questions directly themselves, varies wildly.
In many federal courts, judges limit voir dire to information about a
juror’s occupation, place of residence, potential conflicts of interest,
and whether the juror or their immediate family has been arrested or
163
The judge then asks rhetorical questions
has been a crime victim.
164
about the willingness to obey instructions and to be impartial.
Meanwhile, in many state courts and in some federal courts, lawyers
conduct their own voir dire with great flexibility and use a seemingly
165
limitless array of personal questions. Judges determine the breadth
of voir dire by balancing judicial efficiency against fairness to the liti-

161

162

163

164

165

juries of less than twelve. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 86 (1970) (allowing a jury
of six).
Before a jury is selected, the trial judge conducts voir dire, questioning potential jurors
about their qualifications and backgrounds. Many judges question jurors themselves,
though frequently they allow prosecutors and defense lawyers to do so directly. Judges
vary widely by jurisdiction and discretion in the leeway they give attorneys in voir dire. See
Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 594 (1976) (“Voir dire is conducted under the supervision
of the court, and a great deal must, of necessity, be left to its sound discretion.” (internal
citations omitted)).
See Abbe Smith, “Nice Work If You Can Get It”: “Ethical” Jury Selection in Criminal Defense, 67
FORDHAM L. REV 523, 525–26 (1998) (describing a judge who was from the “Any-Twelvein-the-Box-Will-Do” school of jury selection and would not allow attorneys to conduct voir
dire).
See Nancy S. Marder, Juries, Justice, & Multiculturalism, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 659, 674–75
(2002) (arguing that using only basic and limited questions in a “cursory process at best”
is likely due to judicial desire for efficiency, but has the negative consequence that very
little information is provided in order to root out biased jurors and provide as close to an
impartial jury as possible). In other cases, judges (and lawyers) probe deeper into private
attitudes and practices. For example, they sometimes ask about religious beliefs, drinking
habits, jobs, hobbies, etc. See Alschuler, supra note 64, at 158.
See Mu’Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 451 (1991) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“There is no
single way to voir dire a juror. . . . [A trial] judge can also evaluate impartiality by explaining the trial processes and asking general questions about the juror’s commitment to follow the law and the trial court’s instructions.”).
See Bennett, supra note 102, at 159 (stating that federal courts generally allow less lawyer
involvement); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(a) (stating that the court may examine prospective jurors or permit attorneys to do so); Ristaino, 424 U.S. at 594 (quoting Connors v.
United States, 158 U.S. 408, 413 (1895)) (“Voir dire ‘is conducted under the supervision
of the court, and a great deal must, of necessity, be left to its sound discretion.’”); Anne
M. Payne & Christine Cohoe, Jury Selection and Voir Dire in Criminal Cases, 76 AM. JUR.
TRIALS 127, 143 (2000) (stating that “[m]ost states give trial counsel broad discretion in
questioning prospective jurors”).
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166

gants. There is no per se right for lawyers to have jurors questioned
167
about their biases.
The most direct approach to rooting out bias during voir dire
would simply allow lawyers to question potential jurors directly on the
168
issue of prejudice in an effort to uncover discriminatory beliefs.
The skillful use of voir dire might identify racial or gender bias
169
against either the defendant or victim.
The judge could strike
those jurors for cause in obvious cases, or lawyers could use their pe170
remptory challenges in subtle ones.
171
Voir dire about bias is clearly no panacea.
Questioning a jury
panel does not often result in defiant expressions or tearful confes172
Even those jurors conscious of their own
sions of discrimination.
discrimination will be loathe to admit to it in public, particularly in a

166

167

168

169

170

171

172

See Laura A. Rousseau, Privacy and Jury Selection: Does the Constitution Protect Prospective Jurors from Personally Intrusive Voir Dire Questions?, 3 RUTGERS J.L. URB. POL’Y 287, 296 (2006)
(citing Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S. 308, 310 (1931)) (stating that trial judges have
“broad discretion to determine the scope and breadth of the voir dire process”); RosalesLopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 189 (1981) (recognizing the broad role of the court
with respect to voir dire); Mu’Min, 500 U.S. at 422–24 (recognizing the importance of the
discretion of the trial court with respect to voir dire); United States v. Padilla-Valenzuela,
896 F. Supp. 968, 970 (D. Ariz. 1995) (asserting that trial judges have broad discretion to
determine both the scope and breadth of the voir process).
See Mu’Min, 500 U.S. at 421–31 (affirming petitioner’s conviction despite the trial judge’s
refusal to allow defendant to thoroughly voir dire about the effect of pretrial publicity);
see also State v. Zola, 548 A.2d 1022, 1027–28 (N.J. 1988) (finding that defendants have no
constitutional right to attorney-conducted voir dire).
See Kathleen M. McKenna, Current Developments in Federal Civil Practice 2010, 821 PRAC. L.
INST. 581, 586 (William P. Frank and John L. Gardiner eds., 2010) (stating that attorneyconducted voir dire allows attorneys to explore biases based on in-depth knowledge about
their own cases).
See Lucy Fowler, Gender and Jury Deliberations: The Contributions of Social Science, 12 WM. &
MARY J. WOMEN & L. 1, 45 (2005) (discussing use of voir dire to eliminate jurors with
gender prejudices); see also McClain, supra note 155, at 306 (discussing the importance of
voir dire to eliminating jury discrimination without violating Batson’s prohibition on presuming such prejudice according to race).
See discussion of bias against victims as a basis for a “for cause” strike infra Part III.B; see
also Smith, supra note 162, at 566 n.201 (describing a personal anecdote in which the author admits that she and her co-counsel exercised almost all of their peremptory strikes to
excuse whites, since they wanted as many black and Hispanic jurors as they could get to
help their defendant’s case).
Some research observers have been unimpressed with the effectiveness of attorneys’ efforts to uncover juror bias. See generally Reid Hastie, Is Attorney-Conducted Voir Dire an Effective Procedure for the Selection of Impartial Juries?, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 703, 710–17 (1991) (explaining that, based on statistical models, “an attorney’s ability to predict appears limited
by a very low ceiling of precision”).
See Newton N. Minow & Fred H. Cate, Who Is an Impartial Juror in an Age of Mass Media?, 40
AM. U. L. REV. 631, 650–51 (1991) (arguing that voir dire “fails to elicit accurate or honest
responses from potential jurors” and is therefore ineffective to root out prejudice”).
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173

setting in which such views are anathema. The kind of blunt admissions required to convince hesitant judges to dismiss a juror for cause
174
are indeed rare.
Nevertheless, a juror who does not proclaim bias may hint at it.
Voir dire elicits a great deal of subtle information that can prove use175
ful to the exercise of peremptory challenges. A juror may not proclaim a refusal to enforce rape laws because of gender bias, but might
176
signal a general skepticism towards rape victims.
A juror may not
177
profess racism but may express concerns about racial “quotas.” Unless the judge allows the attorney to ask such questions, however, that
potential bias will remain hidden, and lawyers will rely on far more
178
superficial information.
The Supreme Court has accorded defendants the constitutional
right to voir dire jurors about potential racism if there is a significant
179
likelihood that prejudice will likely affect jurors. In Ristaino v. Ross
173

174

175

176
177

178

179

  

Marshall & Smith, supra note 104, at 214; Johnson, supra note 20, at 1675 (discussing tendency of potential jurors to hide their racist attitudes and the difficulty of penetrating this
shield through voir dire).
This is particularly true because judges tend to avoid striking for cause. See Maureen A.
Howard, Taking the High Road: Why Prosecutors Should Voluntarily Waive Peremptory Challenges, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 369, 414–15, 414 at n.230 (“Commentators have noted
judicial reluctance to challenges for cause. This may be particularly true in jurisdictions
where judges are subject to reelection . . . [and] some judges engage in ‘aggressive rehabilitation,’ asking challenged jurors if they could set aside their experiences and feelings
and follow the judge’s orders . . . .”); Julie A. Wright, Comment, Challenges For Cause Due to
Bias or Prejudice: The Blind Leading the Blind Down the Road of Disqualification, 46 BAYLOR L.
REV. 825, 825–26 (1994); see also J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 143–44 (1994)
(“Voir dire provides a means of discovering actual or implied bias and a firmer basis upon
which the parties may exercise their peremptory challenges intelligently.”).
See People v. Williams, 628 P.2d 869, 877 (Cal. 1981) (holding that counsel should be allowed to ask questions to elicit bias on voir dire). The court in Williams recognized that:
“[A]lthough we must presume that a potential juror is responding in good faith when he
asserts broadly that he can judge the case impartially, further interrogation may reveal bias of which he is unaware or which, because of his impaired objectivity, he reasonably believes he can overcome. And although his protestations of impartiality may immunize
him from a challenge for cause, they should not foreclose further reasonable questioning
that might expose bias on which prudent counsel would base a peremptory challenge.”
Id. at 873 (internal quotations omitted).
In trials where gender is a subtler issue, voir dire is used to minimize gender discrimination by eliminating jurors who possess such prejudice. Fowler, supra note 169, at 44–45.
See Wendy Parker, Juries, Race, and Gender: A Story of Today’s Inequality, 46 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 209, 212 (2011) (stating that “many studies demonstrate a bias of white jurors
against black defendants”).
Ross v. Ristaino, 508 F.2d 754, 757 (1st Cir. 1974) (“[W]e do not allow the possibility of a
false answer to serve as an excuse for not asking these questions.”), rev’d on other grounds,
424 U.S. 589 (1976).
Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 594–98 (1976) (holding that, unlike Ham, the circumstances herein “did not suggest a significant likelihood that racial prejudice might infect
[the defendant’s] trial” and therefore the right to voir dire about racial prejudice did not
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and Turner v. Murray, the Court held that both the Sixth Amendment
and the Equal Protection Clause require voir dire on the subject of
race discrimination when there is a clear risk of it affecting the ver180
dict. The Court explained the constitutional necessity of trumping
the trial judge’s broad discretion about the scope of voir dire:
On the facts of this case, a juror who believes that blacks are violence
prone or morally inferior might well be influenced by that belief in deciding whether petitioner’s crime involved the aggravating factors specified under Virginia law [for the death penalty]. . . . More subtle, less consciously held racial attitudes could also influence a juror’s decision in this
case. Fear of blacks, which could easily be stirred up by the violent facts
181
of petitioner’s crime, might incline a juror to favor the death penalty.

A defendant who can meet the standard of showing a likelihood of
racial discrimination can thus invoke a constitutional right to require
voir dire on racism.
2. Prosecutors Should Have a Corresponding Right to Voir Dire on the
Subject of Bias
The Court has never recognized a commensurate right for prosecutors to voir dire jurors about potential unlawful discrimination
against victims; thus, a prosecutor asking permission for voir dire on
bias would have to base the request on vague notions of fairness. She
would not have access to the defendant’s binding equal protection
182
and Sixth Amendment guarantees.
Prosecutors currently have no
right to ask jurors about their racial attitudes in the trial of a hate
183
crime. They have no right to question potential jurors in the trials

180
181
182

183

rise to “constitutional dimensions”); see also Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 524–25,
529 (1973) (holding that a known civil rights activist on trial for marijuana possession had
right to voir dire prospective jurors on racial prejudice).
Ristaino, 424 U.S. at 595–96; Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 36 n.9 (1986). The Court has
not yet ruled on this subject in the context of gender.
Turner, 476 U.S. at 35.
As a practical matter, such a right might seem superfluous because a trial judge required
to permit voir dire on discrimination for a defendant will probably give commensurate
leeway to the prosecutor. But in the very cases where the risk of discriminatory acquittal
is highest, the defense lawyer may have no interest in requesting such voir dire. A defendant in a rape trial or a hate crime trial, would likely have no incentive to ask jurors about
race or gender bias, and on the contrary, would want to keep bias against the victim hidden. Thus prosecutors need an articulable right to demand voir dire to protect against
discriminatory acquittal.
See McClain, supra note 155, at 306 (discussing the importance of voir dire to eliminating
jury discrimination without violating Batson’s prohibition on presuming such prejudice
according to race).
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of gender-based violence about their attitudes towards women and
184
the permissibility of rape or domestic violence.
The Court’s constitutional reasoning in Ristaino and Turner should
apply to allow prosecutors to root out bias against victims because the
Constitution prohibits both discriminatory convictions and acquit185
tals. I have argued elsewhere that the Equal Protection Clause for186
bids juries from basing verdicts on race or gender discrimination.
When individuals serve on a jury, they function as state actors bound
by the Equal Protection Clause, just as judges do when they decide a
187
bench trial.
A jury may no more acquit because of the race of the victim than
the jury might convict because of the race of the defendant. The Supreme Court held in McCleskey v. Kemp that a jury may not render a
death penalty verdict based on the defendant’s race, nor indeed,
188
based upon a victim’s race. As described above, prosecutors should
have third-party standing to invoke the constitutional rights of victims
to true equal protection, much as prosecutors already have thirdparty standing to protect the public’s confidence in a fair system.
The other source of authority in the voir dire cases, the Sixth
Amendment, textually belongs to the defendant. Yet the Supreme
184

185
186

187

188

See Fowler, supra note 169, at 8–10; see also Mark Soler, “A Woman’s Place . . .”: Combating SexBased Prejudices in Jury Trials Through Voir Dire, 15 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 535, 568–70 (1975)
(“The Supreme Court, however, has not applied the same constitutional test to sex discrimination as it has to racial discrimination.”).
See Tetlow, supra note 3, at 103–16, 128 (outlining the argument as to why discriminatory
convictions and acquittals violate the constitution).
I do not argue that victims have a right to any particular verdict in a criminal trial, nor to
a resulting panoply of procedural rights, but only that victims retain an equal protection
right against acquittals based upon discrimination. It is not necessary to imbue victims
with procedural due process rights in order to protect their equal protection rights. See
id. at 109–11 (arguing that the Equal Protection Clause generally prohibits state action
based on discrimination).
For discussion of state action of juries, see id. at 105–06. Perhaps the most exciting and
seemingly obvious insight produced by the recognition of discriminatory acquittal is that
jurors must in fact be state actors. The Supreme Court repeatedly states in dicta that jury
verdicts are “a quintessential governmental body.” Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 54
(1992). Jurors are selected and paid by the state to serve a governmental function, to apply the law to the evidence in a trial, and to render a verdict that will have the force of
law. In bench trials, we would never question the idea that a judge performing these
same functions would be governed by the Equal Protection Clause.
481 U.S. 279, 336 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that such discrimination
treats victims and defendants as a “faceless, undifferentiated mass” rather than individual,
unique human beings, thus resulting in a devaluation of the lives of black victims (internal quotation marks omitted)). McCleskey “held that the jury system and the fair crosssection principle were designed to eliminate any discrimination in the imposition of sentence based on the race of the victim.” Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 511 n.8 (1990)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Court has often described the right to an “impartial jury” as belong189
ing more broadly to society as a whole. “Although the constitutional guarantee runs only to the individual and not to the State, the goal
it expresses is jury impartiality with respect to both contestants: nei190
The defenther the defendant nor the State should be favored.”
dant does not have a right to a jury that tips towards his cause, but to
191
an impartial jury. As such, courts have equal obligations to root out
192
bias towards either side.
A truly “impartial jury” could not allow discrimination against the
victim to be the deciding factor in an acquittal. The interplay of the
Sixth Amendment and equal protection rights requires, as a bare
minimum, a jury that does not use race or gender as the basis of the
193
verdict. If a potential juror displays bias that would lead to conviction or acquittal, such a juror has no place on a constitutionally
sound jury.
Our criminal justice system may ignore the equal protection rights
of victims because they lack a direct, obvious remedy within the crim194
inal justice system, but it has no excuse for refusing to protect vic189

190
191

192

193
194

  

See, e.g., McCollum, 505 U.S. at 49–50 (noting, among other rationales regarding the public as a whole, that “as public confidence in criminal justice is undermined by a conviction
in a trial where racial discrimination has occurred in jury selection, so is public confidence undermined where a defendant, assisted by racially discriminatory peremptory
strikes, obtains an acquittal”).
Holland, 493 U.S. at 483.
See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 154 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(“[T]he Constitution guarantees a right only to an impartial jury, not to a jury composed
of members of a particular race or gender.”).
Scholars have struggled for decades to come up with more results-oriented mechanisms
to guarantee jury diversity, perhaps with a quota system. They have focused on the notion of juries as representative of the defendant rather than as representative of a fair
cross-section of the community as a whole. See Harold A. McDougall, Note, The Case for
Black Juries, 79 YALE L.J. 531, 548 (1970) (proposing proportional representational
schemes for minorities in petit juries); Johnson, supra note 20, at 1698–99 (proposing at
least three jurors be “racially similar” to the defendant); DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM,
AND AMERICAN LAW 467–68 (5th ed. 2004) (proposing a 50-50 “split jury” as basis for discussion). Acknowledging the issue of discriminatory acquittal, however, throws a significant wrench in such proposals. Why would we create a system that guarantees representation for the defendants charged with murdering Emmett Till and beating Rodney King
without also providing jury representation based on the race of the victim? Instead, the
Court’s existing focus on jury diversity as representative of the community makes sense as
a protection of the broader equal protection rights at stake.
See Tetlow, supra note 3, at 109–11.
Several scholars argue convincingly that double jeopardy does not, and should not, ban
the reversal of an acquittal obtained through fundamental defects in the judicial process,
whether through witness tampering or misconduct by defense counsel. See, e.g., Thomas
DiBiagio, Judicial Equity: An Argument for Post-Acquittal Retrial When the Judicial Process is
Fundamentally Defective, 46 CATH. U. L. REV. 77, 78–79 (1996). The Supreme Court did
not first hold that prosecutorial appeal violated double jeopardy until 1896, and then it
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tims with the instrumental protections against jury discrimination.
Prosecutors should be given the right and responsibility to exercise
those protections. They should have the same rights to voir dire
195
about bias as do defendants, based on the same reasoning.
B. The Supreme Court Should Expand Voir Dire Rights for Both Sides
It is not enough to apply the defendant’s rights to voir dire on
discrimination to prosecutors without also attempting to broaden
those rights. The Supreme Court frequently acknowledges the importance of voir dire in dicta, yet strangely limits the constitutional
right to inquire into bias, leaving the scope of voir dire almost entire196
ly to the discretion of trial judges.
Worse yet, the Court seems determined to solve the problem of jury discrimination by pretending
197
that it rarely exists, and thus discourages trial judges from exercising their discretion to allow voir dire about discrimination. The
Court should strengthen the right to voir dire about bias, and should
apply it to protect against both discriminatory conviction and acquittal.

195

196

197

reversed positions on the subject until finally banning prosecutorial appeals and retrials
in a closely-divided opinion. Id. at 83–89. I do not grapple here with the possibility of reversing course again and allowing prosecutorial appeals, though I believe it is worth considering for the reasons discussed in these articles.
On a pragmatic note, one reason that courts have not articulated procedural rights to
protect against discriminatory acquittal is because prosecutors cannot appeal acquittals,
and appellate courts do not generally have occasion to consider whether anyone in the
courtroom can act to protect against jury discrimination. Without guidance from appellate courts, trial judges will hesitate to recognize new procedural rights that might lead to
reversal of a conviction. But these problems are not insurmountable. The procedural
protections I propose can reach appellate courts in either of two ways. If prosecutors can
persuade a few trial judges to apply protections to prevent jury discrimination, defendants
will challenge those protections on appeal, creating further guidance for other courts.
Conversely, prosecutors in some states could appeal the denial of such rights with an interlocutory appeal, as the State of Georgia did in McCollum. Federal law would not allow
such an interlocutory appeal. 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (2006).
See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 129 (1994); see generally Babcock, supra note 75, at
551 (describing the importance of voir dire in rooting out potential discrimination);
Crawford & Patterson, supra note 150, at 662 (“Opening up the questioning process is
likely to enhance the quality of juror screening without doing violence to the fair trial
ideal.”).
J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 154 (Kennedy, J. concurring); Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 61
(1992) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“In Batson, however, this Court began to depart from
Strauder by holding that, without some actual showing, suppositions about the possibility
that jurors may harbor prejudice have no legitimacy.”); see Carter, supra note 34, at 446–
47 (noting that the Justices in McCleskey purposefully chose to ignore the pervasive problem of “racialism” in American society that pervades juries because the cost of acknowledgement is too high).
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As described above, if a defense lawyer requests voir dire designed
to expose any bias in the jury pool, the Supreme Court only requires a
trial judge to grant the request if there is a “significant likelihood”
198
The problem lies in the
that prejudice will likely affect jurors.
Court’s extremely limited definition of when a risk of jury discrimina199
tion exists.
Empirical evidence shows a serious risk of racial discrimination
against defendants (and an even greater risk of racial discrimination
against victims) in every trial, but particularly in trials of interracial
200
crimes. In Ristaino, however, the Court held that such bias cannot
201
be presumed, even when the case involves an interracial crime. Instead the trial must clearly involve an element of race, for example, a
202
prosecution for a racially-motivated crime.
Only in the context of the death penalty does an interracial crime
203
require permission to voir dire on bias. In Turner v. Murray, a black
defendant charged with murdering a white victim was not allowed to
voir dire the jury about potential bias, and the resulting jury con204
The Supreme Court revicted him and sentenced him to death.

198

199

200

201

202

203
204

Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 596–98 (1976) (holding that the interracial nature of the
crime did not require voir dire about racial prejudice because “[t]he circumstances thus
did not suggest a significant likelihood that racial prejudice might infect [the defendant’s] trial”); Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 529 (1973) (finding that a known
civil rights activist on trial for marijuana possession had a right to voir dire on racial prejudice). To give an example of how unduly limited the right remains for defendants, the
Fifth Circuit affirmed a conviction in which white supremacist defendants accused of defacing a synagogue and assaulting non-whites in a park were not permitted to voir dire jurors about bias because those issues were not clearly relevant to the trial. United States v.
Greer, 939 F.2d 1076, 1084 (5th Cir. 1991).
The Court grants trial judges great discretion on whether to voir dire about bias broadly
defined. In Mu’Min v. Virginia, for example, the Court upheld the defendant’s conviction despite the refusal of the trial judge to allow thorough voir dire about the jury’s exposure to pretrial publicity. 500 U.S. 415, 431–32 (1991).
William J. Bowers, Marla Sandys & Thomas W. Brewer, Crossing Racial Boundaries: A
Closer Look at the Roots of Racial Bias in Capital Sentencing When the Defendant is
Black and the Victim is White, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1497, 1531–32 (2004); William J. Bowers, Benjamin D. Steiner & Marla Sandys, Death Sentencing in Black and White: An Empirical Analysis of the Role of Jurors’ Race and Jury Racial Composition, 3 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 171, 259–61 (2001).
Ristaino, 424 U.S. at 596–98 (holding that a criminal defendant does not have a constitutional right to voir dire about racial bias based solely on the interracial nature of the
charged crime).
See id. at 596–97 (explaining that in Ham, “[r]acial issues . . . were inextricably bound up
with the conduct of the trial” because the defendant was a prominent civil rights leader
whose position as such was “likely to intensify any prejudice that individual members of
the jury might harbor”).
Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S 28, 36–38 (1986).
Id. at 29.
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versed the sentence but not the murder conviction, though the ver205
dicts were rendered by the same jury. The Court’s unusual parsing
of the right to voir dire led to the classic Brennan response: “King
Solomon did not, in fact, split the baby in two, and had he done so, I
suspect that he would be remembered less for his wisdom than for his
206
The majority nevertheless did split the baby,
hardheartedness.”
and reversed the death penalty verdict, but upheld the unexamined
207
jury’s murder conviction.
Is a constitutional right really necessary to convince trial judges of
the importance of voir dire on bias? The Supreme Court, for example, has invited judges to permit voir dire about racial bias, even
208
Because judges
when not required to do so, as “the wiser course.”
have vast discretion to make decisions about the scope of voir dire,
they also have the authority to permit questioning about potential ju209
ror bias against either defendant or victim. If the trial judge can be
persuaded of the importance of voir dire on the subject of bias, there
210
need be no constitutional demand.
My own experience, however, is that judges rarely do allow such
questioning, for reasons rooted in the Supreme Court’s attitude towards both the nature of impartiality generally, and discrimination
211
There is a fundamental disconnect between the ways
specifically.
that many judges perceive jury selection, and the realities of an adversarial and balanced self-interested process.
Judges who severely limit the breadth of voir dire often do so because of discomfort with the very nature of using an adversarial
process to pick a “fair jury.” Our system does not actually task lawyers
with selecting an impartial jury, but rather attempts to harness selfinterest and the adversarial process to eliminate the extremes on ei212
ther side. Lawyers do not generally believe in the mythical creature
of an “impartial juror.” Instead, they try their best to distinguish be205
206
207

208
209
210
211

212

Id. at 37–38.
Id. at 44 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
The Court provided a somewhat more stringent requirement on federal courts as a matter of supervisory authority. In Rosales-Lopez v. United States, a plurality of the Court held
that any crime involving alleged interracial violence invokes the right to voir dire about
potential prejudices, though a non-violent or victimless crime does not. 451 U.S. 182, 192
(1981).
Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 597 n.9. (1976).
Rosales-Lopez, 451 U.S. at 189–90.
Id. at 191 n.7.
For examples of trial courts refusing to conduct voir dire on racial bias, see Barry P.
Goode, Religion, Politics, Race, and Ethnicity: The Range and Limits of Voir Dire, 92 KY. L.J.
601, 676–81 (2004).
See Babcock, supra note 75, at 559–62.
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tween those jurors partial to their side and those jurors partial to the
213
Judges, in contrast, are more likely to have an aspiraother side.
tional view of impartiality as an identifiable, and quite common, hu214
man characteristic.
The nature of the jury selection requires lawyers to seek the jury
215
But for judges for whom that selfmost favorable to their cause.
interest registers as unseemly, the kind of voir dire necessary to un216
cover partiality seems unnecessary and even harmful. In-depth voir
217
Voir dire on the
dire seems an unnecessary violation of privacy.
subject of juror bias seems like a rude accusation. For these judges, it
would almost suffice to look jurors in the eye and ask them, with
218
great solemnity, if they can be impartial.
Judges tend to have even more discomfort with voir dire on the
subject of discrimination because current doctrine suggests that rais219
ing the issue will create bias where it did not otherwise exist. In Ristaino, the Supreme Court literally forbade trial judges from presum220
ing too readily that the jury might indulge in racial bias. The idea
itself seems too destructive, no matter how empirically proven. “In
our heterogeneous society policy as well as constitutional considerations militate against the divisive assumption—as a per se rule—that
justice in a court of law may turn upon the pigmentation of skin, the
221
accident of birth, or the choice of religion.”
The Court currently
insists on the aspirational and counterfactual view that jurors are un213
214
215

216

217
218
219
220

221

Id.
See Bennett, supra note 102, at 158–60.
One might object that prosecutors lack a client, and thus do not have permission to be so
self-interested. Yet by definition, a prosecutor bringing a case to trial is supposed to be
acting in his or her own interests, and is psychologically motivated to do so, because he or
she believes the case is just. In that situation, finding jurors partial to believing the government’s witnesses seems to the prosecutor to be “doing justice.”
See, e.g., United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 227 (2d Cir. 1950), aff’d, 341 U.S. 494
(1951) (explaining, in an opinion by Judge Learned Hand, that “[i]t is of the nature of
our deepest antipathies that often we do not admit them even to ourselves; but when that
is so, nothing but an examination, utterly impracticable in a courtroom, will disclose
them” and concluding that “[n]o such examination is required,” because “[i]f trial by
jury is not to break down by its own weight, it is not feasible to probe more than the upper levels of a juror’s mind”).
Id. at 228.
See Bennett, supra note 102, at 160.
Id. at 158.
Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 590 (1976) (holding that there is no constitutional requirement “that a question specifically directed to racial prejudice be asked during voir
dire” anytime there is a confrontation in a criminal trial between people of different races).
Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 50 n.8 (1986) (Powell, J., dissenting) (quoting Ristaino,
424 U.S. at 596 n.8) (emphasis omitted).
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biased, and worse yet, the Court actually forbids recognition of the
realities of jury discrimination.
Trial judges thus receive quite mixed signals about, on the one
hand, their obligations to root out jury discrimination, and on the
other hand, the unconstitutionality of assuming that jury discrimina222
tion exists. The Supreme Court requires that trial judges constantly
attest that they are ignoring the elephant in the room. Worse, the
Court worries that to mention the elephant in the room will make
everyone else see it for the first time. As Justice Powell explained explicitly: “Asking such a question [about prejudice] in the absence of
circumstances that make clear a need for it could well have the negative effect of suggesting to the jurors that race somehow is relevant to
223
the case.”
The Court’s frequent rhetoric about the danger of introducing the subject of juror prejudice makes judges quite nervous
224
about doing so, as if to name the issue will create it.
The Court blunts the most useful weapons in its battle against the
race and gender bias that clearly infects the criminal justice system,
by denying that obvious fact. Its entire approach to tackling the terrible problem of jury discrimination, a problem so clearly proven by
the empirical evidence presented in McCleskey v. Kemp, is to mandate
225
a state of denial. To recognize the proven realities of endemic jury
226
discrimination would prove too “divisive.”
Even in the context of the Court’s colorblindness, surely the least
controversial tool available to root out bias from juries is to question
potential jurors on the subject before seating them. In the Batson
line of cases, the Court banned lawyers from assuming that a juror’s
race or gender could predict whether jurors would discriminate dur227
ing deliberations. The Court pointed to the possibility of voir dire
222

223
224

225

226
227

  

Bennett, supra note 102, at 158 (“[J]udge-dominated voir dire . . . actually perpetuate[s]
legal fictions that allow implicit bias to flourish.”). See, e.g., Commonwealth v. A Juvenile,
485 N.E.2d 170, 175 (Mass. 1985) (explaining that racial inquiry “may activate latent racial bias in certain prospective jurors or may insult others without uncovering evidence of
bias in hard-core bigots who refuse to acknowledge their prejudice” (internal citations
omitted)).
Turner, 476 U.S. at 48 n.5 (Powell, J., dissenting).
See Ristaino, 424 U.S. at 596, n.8 (rejecting a rule that would have allowed questions on
racial prejudice to be asked anytime participants in the case were of different races). This
logic is similar to the idea that it is sex education that makes kids think about sex.
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 293–97 (1987) (discussing the Baldus study presented
to the Court, which showed significant statistical evidence revealing an increased likelihood that a defendant would receive the death penalty if convicted of killing a white person rather than a black person).
Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 596 n.8 (1976).
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 631 (1991) (“Whether the race generality employed by litigants to challenge a potential juror derives from open hostility or
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as a way to determine bias through individual inquiry rather than
228
Yet the Court has not given litigants
race or gender stereotypes.
that right. Had the Supreme Court more broadly defined the right
to voir dire about bias, it could have cured the problems it worried
about.
Voir dire makes stereotypes less tempting by offering more accu229
rate and individualized information about jurors.
It replaces reliance on a juror’s race and gender as proxies for belief with more sa230
If lawyers can instead ask jurors specific
lient information.
questions about their beliefs, lawyers will find it both possible and de231
sirable to rely on other factors. The more information derived, the
more complex and individualized potential jurors will seem.
Broad voir dire, thus, harnesses the power of self-interest to avoid
232
stereotyping. Lawyers do not seek to skew the demographics of the
jury for the sake of doing so. Lawyers seek a jury more favorable to
233
their cause and less favorable to the other side’s cause. They have a

228

229
230

231

232

233

from some hidden and unarticulated fear, neither motive entitles the litigant to cause injury to the excused juror.”); J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 138 n.9, 139 n.11
(1994) (asserting that statistical evidence linking gender and belief was “conjured up”
and a “quasi-empirical claim”); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410 (1990) (calling the idea
that race predicts belief “the very stereotype the law condemns”).
J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 143–44 (“If conducted properly, voir dire can inform litigants about
potential jurors, making reliance upon stereotypical and pejorative notions about a particular gender or race both unnecessary and unwise. Voir dire provides a means of discovering actual or implied bias and a firmer basis upon which the parties may exercise their
peremptory challenges intelligently.” (emphasis omitted)).
Id.
See United States v. Greer, 968 F.2d 433, 445 (5th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (Higginbotham, J.,
writing for those who would reverse) (describing the importance of allowing broad voir
dire on issues of potential prejudice in order to avoid Batson error).
See Brian J. Serr & Mark Maney, Racism, Peremptory Challenges, and the Democratic Jury: The
Jurisprudence of a Delicate Balance, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 55 n.301 (1988) (“Prosecutorial inquiry into the existence of specific bias, rather than merely striking because
of broad assumptions based on race, age, or status, actually promotes the accuracy of peremptory challenges.”).
Colbert, supra note 22, at 121 n.584 (“For jury selection to be meaningful, the defense
attorney must conduct the voir dire.”); see generally Andrew G. Gordon, Note, Beyond Batson v. Kentucky: A Proposed Ethical Rule Prohibiting Racial Discrimination in Jury Selection, 62
FORDHAM L. REV. 685, 705 (1993) (arguing that voir dire can be used to combat racial
prejudice in jury trials); Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Language and Culture (Not to Say Race) of
Peremptory Challenges, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 21, 46 (1993) (promoting voir dire as a mechanism for fighting racial prejudice in jury trials); Charles J. Ogletree, Just Say No!: A
Proposal To Eliminate Racially Discriminatory Uses of Peremptory Challenges, 31 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 1099, 1127–28 (1994) (agreeing with the position that voir dire can effectively mitigate juror racial prejudice); McClain, supra note 155, at 300 (concurring in the position
that voir dire is a desirable tool for combating racial prejudice in juries).
See Babcock, supra note 75, at 559–62 (discussing techniques lawyers have used to find a
jury that will most likely decide in their client’s favor).
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tremendous vested interest in getting the guesswork of peremptory
234
challenges right.
Instead, the Supreme Court essentially mandates a state of denial
about the possibility of jury discrimination. Lawyers may neither use
235
a juror’s race as a proxy for the risk that they will discriminate, nor
may lawyers attempt to gather more information through individual
236
voir dire about whether a juror tends to discriminate.
The Supreme Court has grappled with jury discrimination by simply pre237
tending by judicial fiat that it no longer exists. When the defendant
in McCleskey presented evidence showing endemic racial discrimination by juries in death penalty cases, particularly based on the race of
the victim, the Court blithely pointed to Batson and Ristaino as the so238
lution.
Before arguing to extend this flawed right to victims, I would
strengthen it. There is no reason not to allow lawyers to voir dire
about bias in any case. Given the Sixth Amendment imperative of an
impartial jury and the Equal Protection Clause prohibition on jury
discrimination, we should use every available tool to root out unconstitutional discrimination. The Court’s argument that this tool should
be made available only when discrimination is a “significant issue” ignores the empirically proven realities. Jury discrimination is ubiquit239
ous.

234

235

236

237
238

239

The systemic hope is that with dueling peremptory challenges (usually weighted towards
the defendant in a criminal case), the remaining jurors will prove the least biased. See
Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965) (explaining that the function of peremptory
challenges is “not only to eliminate extremes of partiality on both sides, but to assure the
parties that the jurors before whom they try the case will decide on the basis of the evidence placed before them, and not otherwise”).
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 104–05 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring) (“Exclusion of
blacks from a jury, solely because of race, can no more be justified by a belief that blacks
are less likely than whites to consider fairly or sympathetically the State’s case against a
black defendant than it can be justified by the notion that blacks lack the intelligence,
experience or moral integrity to be entrusted with that role.” (internal quotations and citations omitted)).
Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 594–95 (1976). Ironically, the colorblind logic of Ristaino
makes it more likely that lawyers will violate the colorblind logic of Batson, creating a never-never land of denial.
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 313 (1987).
Id. at 309 n.30. See also Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 511 n.8 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting ) (“[McCleskey] held that the jury system and the fair-cross-section principles were
designed to eliminate any discrimination in the imposition of sentence based on the race
of the victim.”).
Goode, supra note 211, at 677–79.
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C. Prosecutors’ Protection of Victims Does Not Prejudice Defendants
If it were true that raising the issue of potential discrimination
creates it, then extending the right to prosecutors might prove prejudicial to defendants. But empirical evidence does not support the
Court’s contention, and in fact, the contrary seems to prove true.
Challenging assumptions about race and gender stereotypes has de240
monstrable impact on reducing stereotypes. Indeed, discriminatory
acquittals represent the other side of the same coin as discriminatory
241
convictions.
Sending a message during voir dire (and during the
rest of the trial) that jury discrimination is unacceptable against either the defendant or victim is a mutually reinforcing message. It
serves the legitimate purposes of both sides.
CONCLUSION
Prosecutors should have a constitutionally-based right to voir dire
about bias against victims of crime in order to actualize their duty to
“do justice.” Prosecutors have a crucial and unacknowledged role in
fighting discriminatory acquittals in order to provide true equal protection of the law to minorities and women. Unless we give prosecutors the tools they need to fight these battles, we will continue to suffer endemic rates of jury discrimination against victims.
Discriminatory acquittal has enormous consequences. When juries freed the killers of Medgar Evars and Emmett Till, they gave very
public permission for racial violence. When conviction rates for rape
or the death penalty correlate highly with the race of the victim, juries send a message about the permissibility of violence against black
people. When juries put female victims on trial for their obedience
to gender rules before considering the conviction of a defendant for
rape or domestic violence, they perpetuate the use of gender-based
violence to regulate all women’s behavior.
Prosecutors should have a right to examine jurors for such bias
because a juror who expresses unconstitutional bias against a crime
victim should be excused for cause or, at a minimum, struck with a
peremptory challenge. Voir dire on prejudice is decidedly imperfect,
but it is the most effective available tool to seek out racism and sex240

241

See generally Justin D. Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality: Implicit Bias, Decisionmaking, and
Misremembering, 57 DUKE L.J. 345, 409–17 (2007) (collecting results of empirical studies on
how confronting racial and gender biases helps to dissipate them and helps to improve
the distortion of facts according to race and gender stereotypes).
Tetlow, supra note 3, at 103–16 (drawing parallels between discriminatory acquittals and
discriminatory convictions).
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ism. At the moment, prosecutors lack any constitutional language to
enforce their institutional role in preventing discriminatory acquittal.
Further, the constitutional right to voir dire about bias must be
expanded for both prosecutors and defendants. The Court’s inexplicable restrictiveness of this right has not received nearly enough
attention given its enormous consequences. The Court limits the
most important tool to seek an impartial jury, the chance to inquire
individually of jurors about their discriminatory attitudes and beliefs.
It does so by pretending that introducing the subject of prejudice
during voir dire might actually create such prejudice, and it does so
by positing that it would be “divisive” to assume that such bias occurs
242
frequently. This application of aspirational colorblindness creates a
fundamental barrier to grappling with the proven realities of endemic jury discrimination.
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Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 596 n.8 (1976).
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